Commodification and Contract Formation: Placing the Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations by Gamage, David S
Commodification and Contract Formation: 
Placing the Consideration Doctrine on Stronger Foundations 
 
David Gamage† and Allon Kedem†† 
Abstract: 
Under the traditional consideration doctrine, a promise is only legally enforceable if it is 
made in exchange for something of value.  This doctrine lies at the heart of contract law, yet it 
lacks a sound theoretical justification – a fact that has confounded generations of scholars and 
created a mess of case law. 
 This paper argues that the failure of traditional justifications for the doctrine comes from 
two mistaken assumptions.  First, previous scholars have assumed that anyone can back a 
promise with nominal consideration if they wish to do so.  We show how social norms against 
commodification limit the availability of the consideration form.  Some promises are made in 
social contexts in which invoking consideration—that is, exchanging a promise in return for 
something of value—violates social taboos.  Specifically, we show that anti-commodification 
taboos operate where the social message sent by a transaction is more important than the desire 
to transfer goods or services.  Whereas previous scholarship has assumed one can always invoke 
consideration, we argue that anti-commodification norms make even nominal consideration 
unavailable within these contexts.   
Second, scholars have assumed that when parties utilize a formalism—such as nominal 
consideration—to make their promises legally binding, they necessarily desire to be bound.  
Using a game-theoretic model based on asymmetric information, we dispute the conventional 
wisdom that the law should honor parties’ intentions as articulated at the time of contract 
formation.  We show how parties’ expressed intentions may not conform to their underlying 
desires.  A promisor may render her promise legally enforceable—even though she does not 
want to—in order to signal her sincerity to the promisee.  As a result, in a cycle of inefficient 
signaling, other promisors may feel forced to do the same.  Thus, the mere fact that parties take 
advantage of a legally binding form does not imply that they desire the existence of that option.  
Having the option to legally enforce a promise may harm both promisors and promisees. 
Having exposed these two flawed assumptions, we provide a new framework for 
determining which promises the law should enforce.  Ultimately, what matters is not whether the 
parties actually do invoke consideration, but rather whether they can invoke consideration.  
Norms prevent parties from invoking consideration where the social message sent by a promise 
is more important than the substance of the transaction—and these are precisely the types of 
promises in which inefficient signaling is likely to occur.  In other words, norms block the use of 
consideration precisely where the option for legal enforcement of promises is most likely to harm 
both promisors and promisees.  Therefore, only when social norms allow the use of consideration 
should we conclude that parties truly desire the option to have their promises legally enforced.   
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INTRODUCTION 
People make promises all the time.  In the course of a day, we might promise a spouse to  
complete household chores, a coworker to finish a project by its deadline, and a service provider 
to pay for a service upon completion.  Yet only the last of these promises will generally impose a 
legal obligation.  Whereas the first two statements are mere unilateral promises, the fact that the 
third promise is exchanged for something of value—the service—makes it a contract that can be 
enforced in courts of law. 
 This rule is known as the consideration doctrine: The law will not enforce unilateral 
promises, but promises exchanged for something of value become legally binding contracts.  
There are many exceptions to this doctrine.  Other rules besides consideration can make a 
promise legally binding, and not all promises backed by consideration are legally enforceable.  
Nevertheless, the consideration doctrine remains the most important rule for distinguishing 
between unenforceable promises and contracts backed by law. 
 Unfortunately, we lack a sound theoretical justification for the consideration doctrine.1
Underlying most of contract law is the general principle that parties’ intentions should be 
honored.2 So why, then, do we refuse enforcement to even those unilateral promises which were 
clearly intended to be binding?  
 Existing attempts to justify the consideration doctrine fall into two general camps.  First, 
formalist scholars defend the doctrine as a mechanism for determining parties’ intentions.  By 
creating a hoop the parties must jump through in order to make their promises binding, the law 
creates a mechanism for parties to convey which promises they intend to impose legal 
obligations.  In order to make their promises legally enforceable, the parties need only claim that 
their promise is being exchanged for something of value.  In other words, they need only recite 
consideration. Yet as Eric Posner explains, “there is no reason to require parties to recite a 
consideration as opposed to reciting that they want their [promise] to be enforced. . . .  Efforts to 
rationalize this practice as a way of ensuring that courts can distinguish enforceable and 
unenforceable promises fail because they do not explain the ‘form’ of the formality.”3 No one 
doubts that formal mechanisms have their place within the legal system.  But formal accounts of 
the consideration doctrine have failed to justify the use of consideration specifically.  If the 
ultimate goal is to determine which promises the parties intended to be binding, why not simply 
require parties who desire enforcement to declare so in writing?4
In contrast to formalist scholars, who view the consideration doctrine as a tool for 
determining when parties want their promises to be enforced, substantive theorists see the 
doctrine as a means for separating unilateral promises from exchanges.  Substantive accounts 
argue that unilateral—or “gratuitous”—promises are less socially valuable than promises made 
as part of a bilateral exchange.  The substantive approach cares not for the parties’ intentions or 
what steps they take to communicate a desire to be bound; only “true” exchange promises are 
deemed worthy of legal enforcement. 
 
1 See Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1477-81 (2004). 
2 In the words of Charles Fried, contract law rests on “the liberal principle that the free arrangements of rational 
persons should be respected.” CONTRACT AS PROMISE  35 (1981). 
3 Eric Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 
850 (2003). 
4 See infra Part I.A for more on this point. 
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At first glance, substantive arguments might seem to offer a valid justification for the 
consideration doctrine.  Yet, as we shall see, these arguments fail to withstand sustained 
reflection.5 Like most other scholars who have reviewed the literature, we conclude that 
gratuitous promises are not inherently less deserving of legal support. 
While academics have debated about these flawed accounts of the consideration doctrine, 
courts have floundered over the doctrine’s weak theoretical foundations.  Some courts have 
followed the formalist approach, enforcing promises backed by even trivial amounts of 
consideration, while other courts have invoked substantive principles in striking down promises 
where the consideration is insignificant in value.6 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts rejects 
the use of nominal consideration – consideration of minimal worth – where the Restatement 
(First) had accepted it, but neither version has proved authoritative for how courts actually 
decide these disputes.  As current doctrine stands, there is no predictable answer to the question 
of how much consideration is needed before a promise will be enforced.   
This paper argues that the problematic state of the consideration doctrine flows from two 
assumptions shared by nearly all commentators.  First, scholars have assumed that any parties 
who desire to do so can back a promise with nominal consideration.  And second, scholars have 
assumed that only parties who truly want their promises to be legally enforced will utilize a 
formalism—like nominal consideration—to make their promises binding.  As we will 
demonstrate, both of these assumptions are flawed. 
The first assumption claims that all parties who wish to do so can back their promises 
with nominal consideration.  After all, what could possibly prevent parties from exchanging a 
promise for a penny in order to make it binding?  Our answer is anti-commodification norms.   
By its very nature, the use of consideration commodifies a promise by insisting that the 
promise be exchanged for something of value.  Many promises are made within relationships in 
which the parties are supposed to be guided by more than just self-interest and economic 
rationality.  Within these relationships, a promisor who asks for something in return for her 
promise risks signaling that she views the relationship in instrumental terms.  The consideration 
doctrine can only be activated when parties agree that a promise is made as part of a bargained-
for exchange.  But discussing promises using bargain-oriented language and behavior may be 
inappropriate within certain social contexts.  To even suggest the use of nominal consideration 
might undermine the trust upon which these relationships are built.  
We examine the literature on commodification within three branches of knowledge: (1) 
sociology and anthropology, (2) philosophy and political theory, and (3) economics and game 
theory.  Although the literature does not enable us to determine precisely the circumstances 
under which consideration will be socially unavailable, we can still reach some broad 
conclusions about the nature of anti-commodification norms.  These norms apply when the 
message sent by a promise is more important than the substance of the promise—that is, where 
the actual transfer of the promised goods or services plays only a secondary role. 
For example, when promising to take a loved one out for her birthday, the substance of 
the promise may be less important than the message of affection it conveys.  To commodify this 
sort of promise—say, by asking the loved one to pay a dollar to ensure that the promise is 
honored—would violate anti-commodification norms.  Yet for other promises, the message sent 
 
5 See infra Part I.B.   
6. See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, No. CA03-692, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 341, at *10 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004); Noel v. Noel 
512 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1973). 
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is not as important as the substance of the pledge.  A businesswoman who promises to distribute 
goods on time will not violate norms by asking for payment in return for a guarantee of timely 
delivery. 
 Scholars have recognized the importance of anti-commodification norms for many 
aspects of the legal system—particularly within property law.  Yet contracts scholars have not 
heretofore discussed the implications of these norms for the consideration doctrine.  Although we 
have only a tentative understanding of how these norms work in practice, one conclusion is clear: 
There exist circumstances in which anti-commodification norms block the use of consideration.  
The assumption that all parties who so wish can readily make use of nominal consideration is 
simply wrong.   
We thus have a partial answer to the formalist’s dilemma.  Due to anti-commodification 
norms, a formal rule based on nominal consideration differs from other formal alternatives—
such as a seal or writing requirement.  But does this difference favor the use of nominal 
consideration?  After all, the principle of honoring parties’ intentions would seem to justify using 
the least-restrictive legal rule.  To answer this question, we turn to the second flawed assumption 
made by previous commentators: the assumption that parties’ expressed wishes necessarily 
reflect their underlying desires.   
To follow the principle that contract law should honor parties’ intentions, courts need to 
determine the content of the parties’ intentions.  In the absence of contravening circumstances 
like duress, courts typically assume that parties who invoke a legal rule for making their 
promises binding actually want their promises to be legally enforced.  As adherents of the 
traditional accounts might ask: Why would anyone take steps to bind themselves unless they 
actually wanted to be bound?  Yet as we demonstrate, this logic relies on a shallow 
understanding of the nature of parties’ desires.   
Employing a game-theoretic model based on asymmetric information, we show how 
parties can essentially be forced into a legally binding form once that form is made available to 
them.  Even parties who would prefer not being able to make their promises legally enforceable 
may find it necessary to utilize a doctrine like nominal consideration once it is put into place.  
Crucially, there is a difference between one’s choice when confronted with a legal rule and one’s 
preference for what the legal rule should be.   
Consider the practice of promising.  When a promisor makes her promise legally binding, 
she exposes herself to legal sanction if she doesn’t follow through.  Through this willingness to 
face sanctions, promisors can signal commitment, assuring promisees of their sincerity.  But 
when only some promisors secure their promises through the law, promisees may become 
suspicious of the promisors who fail to do so—suspicious, that is, of promisors who choose not 
to make their promises legally enforceable.  So as not to be seen as unreliable, promisors may be 
forced to render their promises legally binding, even if they would have preferred to avoid the 
potential legal entanglement. 
Thus, promisors’ expressed intentions do not necessarily match their underlying desires.  
Under a regime in which promisors can render their promises legally enforceable, they may 
choose to do so.  However, the promisors might well wish they lived in a regime without this 
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option.  In other words, the mere fact that parties choose to employ a legally binding form does 
not necessarily indicate that they desire the option to use that form.7
Having discarded the two flawed assumptions underlying traditional accounts of the 
consideration doctrine, we can outline our novel justification for the doctrine.  Rejecting the first 
assumption tells us that a rule based on nominal consideration differs from other formal 
alternatives.  Due to anti-commodification norms, not all parties can utilize nominal 
consideration.  Rejecting the second assumption tells us that parties who take advantage of a 
legal rule might not desire its existence.  Utilizing a permissive approach—such as enforcing all 
promises where the parties express a desire for enforcement in writing—could end up harming 
both promisors and promisees. 
To synthesize these two observations into our novel account of the consideration doctrine 
we need one final insight:  Anti-commodification norms deny the option of legal enforcement to 
precisely those parties who should prefer not to have the option made available.  Social norms 
prevent the parties from invoking consideration where the social message sent by a promise is 
more important than the substance of the transaction—and these are precisely the types of 
promises in which inefficient signaling is likely to occur.  Conversely, where the substance of the 
transaction is more important than the message sent, inefficient signaling is unlikely to take 
place.  Thus, where anti-commodification norms allow parties to invoke consideration, the 
parties should generally benefit from having the option to make their promises legally binding.  
And where anti-commodification norms prevent parties from using consideration, we can expect 
that the parties prefer not having an option for legal enforcement.  
 Our novel account of the consideration doctrine is formalist in nature.  Yet where 
previous formalist arguments have been unable to justify the use of consideration over 
alternative forms, we show that the consideration doctrine better tracks parties’ underlying 
desires.  If we allowed parties to bind themselves through an alternative form like a writing 
requirement, some promisors might feel forced to make their promises legally enforceable even 
when they would prefer not to be able to do so.  The consideration doctrine avoids this result by 
providing an option of legal enforceability that can only be exercised within social relationships 
where parties are likely to desire the option. 
 The paper proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the inadequacies of existing theoretical 
accounts of the consideration doctrine and of the manner in which the courts have applied the 
doctrine.  The Part is primarily intended to provide background information; readers who are 
already familiar with the problematic state of the consideration doctrine may wish to skip 
directly to Parts II, III, and IV, where we develop our novel solution to the doctrine’s problems.8
In Part II, we survey the literature on anti-commodification to show how social taboos 
prevent some parties from backing their promises with even nominal consideration.  Part II 
depicts the first flawed assumption made by traditional accounts of the consideration doctrine.  
 
7 The availability of a legally binding form can harm promisees as well as promisors.  There are costs to securing a 
promise through the legal system.  Forcing promisors to bear these costs may lead them to reduce the magnitude of 
their promises, thereby reducing the value received by promisees.  See Part III.C infra.
8 This is not to suggest that Part I adds nothing to the literature.  We believe our description of the inadequacies of 
existing theory and doctrine forms a better overview than other accounts.  We also add several new critiques and 
observations that have not yet appeared in the literature.  Nevertheless, the primary value of our paper lies in Parts 
II, III, and IV.  We doubt that many scholars of the consideration doctrine will be surprised with the results of our 
analysis in Part I.    
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Even when courts enforce promises backed only by nominal consideration, some parties remain 
unable to utilize the consideration form.  
Part III explains the second flawed assumption of existing theories.  The principle of 
honoring parties’ intentions does not mean that we should always look to parties’ expressed 
wishes with regard to an individual transaction.  There is a difference between one’s actions 
when confronted by a legal rule and one’s preference for what the legal rule should be.  Granting 
parties an option to bind themselves can ultimately harm both promisors and promisees. 
Part IV synthesizes the results from the previous two parts to provide a novel justification 
for the consideration doctrine.  Expanding on our game-theoretic analysis, we argue that anti-
commodification norms only prevent the use of consideration in circumstances wherein parties 
should generally prefer not to have a legally binding option made available.  Where the option 
for legal enforcement is beneficial, anti-commodification norms should not prevent parties from 
invoking consideration.  Hence, we would use the consideration doctrine as a means for 
distinguishing, not between promises, but between the social contexts in which promises are 
made. 
 To conclude, we demonstrate how our new justification for the consideration doctrine can 
help resolve the morass of existing case law.  Our account calls for strict application of the 
principle of nominal consideration.  All promises backed by even trivial amounts of 
consideration should be enforced, but promises should generally not be legally obligating 
without at least a token amount of consideration.  This rule obviates the need for the many 
exceptions and qualifications plaguing current applications of the doctrine.  
 
I. THE INADEQUACIES OF EXISTING THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Despite vigorous debates about the underlying rationale for contract law, most 
commentators accept the goal of honoring parties’ intentions as expressed at the time of contract 
formation.  One school of thought maintains that promisors should be free to commit themselves 
to a future course of action, and that enforcing a promise both increases the promisor’s liberty 
and demonstrates respect for her autonomy.9 A second school of thought focuses on the 
promisee’s reasonable expectations, which will be disappointed if the promisor breaches.10 
Under this approach, the enforcement of promises primarily serves to avoid the harms of dashed 
expectations.  A third school of thought emphasizes the social utility of promises, which allow 
promisees to reorder their affairs in anticipation of performance.11 Here, legal enforcement of 
promises is required to ensure that promisees can rely without fear of breach.  Thus, though each 
of the major schools of contract theory begins with a different premise, all three conclude that 
the law should follow a promisor’s stated intentions at the time of promising. 
 Against this backdrop of respecting parties’ wishes, the consideration doctrine requires 
affirmative justification.  By rendering promises unenforceable when not accompanied by 
appropriate recompense, the consideration doctrine departs from the principle of honoring 
parties’ expressed intentions.  The doctrine allows even the most sincere of promisors to later 
renege with impunity when the promise was not made as part of an exchange.  No matter how 
 
9 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 2; Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 289 (1986). 
10 See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, Promises and Practices, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 199 (1990). 
11 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 
(2003). 
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unequivocally the promisor states his intention to perform—though he may “shout consideration 
to the housetops”12—the promise is a legal nullity if consideration is lacking. 
 As discussed previously, attempts to justify the non-enforceability of promises that lack 
consideration divide into two general categories—formal arguments and substantive arguments.  
Yet existing arguments of both types have failed to provide a convincing rationale for the 
consideration doctrine.  Based on these flawed theoretical principles, courts have created a mess 
of their attempts to apply the doctrine to actual cases. 
 
A.  Formal Arguments  
Formal arguments emphasize not the significance of a promise, but the form that it takes.  
The legal system must have some mechanism for distinguishing between unenforceable promises 
and binding contracts.  Formal arguments discuss rationales related to the needs of the legal 
system.  Without a clear set of rules for limiting the promises enforceable in law, we would risk 
having our everyday utterances transformed into binding contracts even when we have no 
intention of invoking a legal form.  On the other hand, it is hard to imagine our capitalist system 
functioning without some method for securing at least those contracts used to facilitate market 
transactions.  No one supports enforcing all promises or none at all.  Formal arguments seek to 
help courts with the difficulties involved in drawing a line between these two extremes. 
 Formal arguments thus stress the importance of a promise’s outward appearance.  
Promises that take a particular form are more worthy of legal enforcement, not because they are 
substantively superior, but because the form says something about the process by which the 
promise came about.  Because formal arguments focus on superficial indicia, rather than on 
content, they often point in opposite directions from substantive arguments.  For instance, 
formalist theories usually support enforcing promises backed by only nominal consideration, 
whereas substantive accounts frequently do not. 
 At first glance, a formal approach to justifying the consideration doctrine might appear to 
serve contract law’s aim of respecting parties’ intentions.  By outlining the conditions under 
which promises will be enforced, the consideration doctrine provides parties with a blueprint for 
giving legal force to their intentions.  Yet the consideration doctrine is a poor means of 
effectuating parties’ wishes, because it denies enforcement to many promises where there is no 
question that the promisor intended to be bound.  An alternative more consistent with the 
underlying goal of respecting parties’ desires would be to require only that the parties clearly 
declare their intentions in writing.13 As the following discussion demonstrates, a writing 
requirement would be preferable to the consideration doctrine in terms of the formal arguments 
typically offered to support it.   
 
1. The “Evidentiary” Rationale 
 
Many formal theorists maintain that the consideration requirement is necessary to 
preserve evidence of a transaction for later judicial inquiry.  In the words of Richard Posner, the 
consideration doctrine “reduces the number of phony contract suits, by requiring the plaintiff to 
prove more than just that someone promised him something; he must show that there was a deal 
 
12 In re Greene, 45 F.2d 428, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). 
13 Arguably, such a requirement would more closely track the expectations of the non-lawyer public.   
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of some sort—which is a little harder to make up out of whole cloth.”14 Because donative 
promises are often oral, consideration is defended as a form of objective proof to corroborate a 
promisee’s claim.15 Such proof allegedly serves to reduce the likelihood that a false claim will 
prevail and lowers the cost of adjudicating all claims.16 
However, to argue that legal enforcement of a promise should only occur where a 
promisee can produce evidence substantiating his claim is not necessarily to argue in favor of a 
consideration requirement.  Many possible methods of maintaining evidence exist, most notably 
a writing requirement.  In fact, the consideration doctrine is a relatively poor way to preserve 
proof, since a promisee’s delivery of a nominal sum to the promisor can be easily denied—
leaving the parties in precisely the same position as if no consideration for the promise existed.  
And when the consideration for one promise is another promise, as is often the case, no evidence 
of the transaction is preserved.17 As Andrew Kull notes, “it is difficult to think of any respect in 
which [problems of proof] are necessarily exacerbated if the promise is gratuitous rather than 
compensated.”18 While the need to preserve evidence may justify some sort of ritual to 
solemnize a transfer, the consideration doctrine is a lousy candidate.19 
2. The “Cautionary” Rationale 
 
Another formal argument claims that the consideration doctrine ensures that a promisor 
intends to be legally bound and that she does so only after sufficient deliberation.20 By requiring 
an extra step—the transfer of consideration—before rendering a promise enforceable, the 
doctrine prevents promisors from hastily committing themselves to obligations they might later 
regret.  The ritual of consideration also ensures that the promisor intends to be bound legally.  
Even a promisor who fully intends to perform at the time the pledge is made may wish not to 
render his promise legally enforceable.  By failing to receive consideration in return for the 
promise, the promisor can ensure that the legal system will not become involved in the event of 
breach. 
As to the former justification, the prevention of hasty promises, one might wonder 
whether the consideration doctrine is overkill.  As Kull notes, “[s]uch cases are easy to imagine 
but hard to find in the reports.”21 In any event, there is little reason to believe that rash donative 
 
14 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 109 (5th ed. 1998). 
15 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1979-1980). 
16 The consideration doctrine’s evidentiary function has been claimed to justify the minority rule that past moral 
obligation may serve as a substitute for consideration.  See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics 
and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 418-19 (1977).  But cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV.
799, 821 (1941) (arguing that promises supported by moral obligation should be enforced despite the “evidentiary 
insecurity” they generate). 
17 See James D. Gordon III, A Dialogue About the Doctrine of Consideration, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 987, 991 (1990). 
18 See Andrew Kull, Reconsidering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 39, 53 (1992). 
19 Moreover, the statute of frauds already requires that substantial problems be recorded in writing, so that problems 
of proof will only exist, if at all, for relatively minor donative promises.  See Gordon, supra note 17, at 990-91. 
20 This section discusses what Fuller called the “channeling” function of consideration in addition to what he labels 
as the “cautionary” function.  
21 Kull, supra note 18, at 46. 
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promises are any more common than rash purchases.22 Yet the law does not control for 
deliberation in bargain context, even though a poorly thought-out bargain might prove ruinous to 
one or both parties, “because the law does not really care about deliberation.”23 However, even 
if the deterrence of hasty donative promises is important, the consideration doctrine is hardly an 
inevitable choice.  Any formal enforceability requirement—that the promisor stand on his head 
and count backwards from twelve, for instance—would serve the same purpose.24 And any 
formality would similarly ensure that the promisor intended to be bound. 
Neither evidentiary nor cautionary arguments can justify the consideration doctrine.  
However worthwhile the desire to preserve evidence for future dispute resolutions or to 
guarantee that donative promises are made carefully and with the intention to be bound, a 
consideration requirement is no better than other formalities.  Indeed, the transfer of a dollar is a 
far shoddier means of preserving proof than a requirement that donative promises be made in 
writing.  Thus, formal arguments for the consideration doctrine cannot “explain the ‘form’ of the 
formality.”25 Although we clearly need some mechanism for distinguishing binding contracts 
from empty statements, existing formal accounts do not show why the consideration doctrine 
best serves this role.  To the extent we believe in the principle of honoring parties’ intentions, we 
should instead enforce all promises where the promisor clearly declares that she wishes to be 
bound. 
 
B.  Substantive Arguments 
Where formal arguments look to the needs of the legal system, substantive arguments 
examine the content of promises.  Some substantive theorists claim that the consideration 
doctrine serves to distinguish between socially valuable exchanges and socially worthless gifts, 
enforcing the former but not the latter.  Others maintain that donative promises should not be 
enforced because the costs of enforcement outweigh the benefits.  Substantive accounts do not 
deny that as a general rule we should enforce promises when the parties desire it.  Instead, 
substantive accounts try to show how this wisdom does not apply to a subset of promises that do 
not merit enforcement.  Substantive arguments thus run directly counter to the idea that contract 
law should respect parties’ intentions in all cases.  No matter how strongly the parties wish to be 
bound, no matter what hoops they are willing to jump through to render their intentions 
enforceable, a substantive approach would deny enforcement to promises not made as part of an 
exchange.  Yet existing substantive arguments for the consideration doctrine ultimately prove 
unpersuasive.   
 
1. The “Sterile” Rationale 
 
A common defense of the consideration doctrine argues that promises lacking in 
consideration are less socially useful than promises exchanged for something of value.  Whereas 
 
22 It is, perhaps, not coincidental that the term “buyer’s remorse” exists but that “donor’s remorse” does not—though 
one might argue, however implausibly, that the existence of the consideration doctrine is responsible for suppressing 
the supply of remorseful donors. 
23 Kull, supra note 18, at 54. 
24 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 991. 
25 Posner, supra note 3, at 850. 
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exchanges enhance overall social wealth, donative transfers merely redistribute it.  
Characterizations of donative promises as economically “sterile” have a long pedigree.  Quoting 
the 1884 lectures of Claude Bufnoir in his famous article, Consideration and Form, Lon Fuller 
opined that “While an exchange of goods is a transaction which conduces to the production of 
wealth and the division of labor, a gift is, in Bufnoir’s words, a “sterile transmission.’”26 And 
this description persists in the literature today.27 
Yet despite the influence of the notion that donative promises are economically sterile, its 
validity is highly questionable.  As a preliminary matter, donative transfers may themselves be 
welfare-enhancing:  If the donee values a gift more than the donor, then the transfer enhances 
social utility.  As Melvin Eisenberg explains, “gifts have a wealth-redistribution effect, and taken 
as a class probably redistribute wealth to persons who have more utility for money than the 
donors.”28 
Some economists have claimed that gift giving is inefficient, because—barring wealth 
effects—if a donee had valued the gift at more than its cost, then the donee would have already 
purchased it for himself.  That the donee did not purchase the item for himself suggests that he 
values it at less than its price.  But there are several reasons to doubt this claim.  First, the value a 
donee places on an item may increase by virtue of the fact that the item is given as a gift.  Many 
are those who would walk by a flower stand without buying anything but would be thrilled to 
receive a dozen roses from a loved one.  The giving of a gift suggests thoughtfulness and 
affection on the part of the giver, and these sentimental effects may increase the gift’s value well 
beyond its purchase price.  Second, in some situations the donor may have better information 
than the donee either about the donee’s preferences or, more likely, about the existence, 
availability, or value of the gift.  The donor may also have better access to the gift.  For instance, 
the donor may promise to return from a trip to the Andes with an Incan vase she knows her 
friend would love.  Third, many gifts cannot be purchased.  A particular piece of artwork, for 
instance, may only exist in the donor’s collection.  If the donee values the piece more than the 
donor, the donor will increase social welfare by giving it as a gift.  Donative promises to perform 
services often fall into this category.  Fourth, the donor gets satisfaction from knowing that her 
gift will be appreciated by the donee—in economic terms, the donor and donee have 
“interdependent utility functions.”29 As Richard Posner has observed, “a promise would not be 
made unless it conferred utility on the promisor.”30 Even if the donee values the gift below its 
cost, the combination of the donor’s satisfaction and the gift’s value to the donee may exceed the 
gift’s cost.  Finally, gifts may be given as a means of facilitating future economic transactions, 
 
26 Fuller, supra note 16, at 815 (quoting CLAUDE BUFNOIR, PROPRIÉTÉ ET CONTRAT 487 (2d ed. 1924)). 
27 See Kull, supra note 18, at 49 (“Bufnoir’s lectures . . . continue to be cited by American writers for this . . . 
assertion.”).  However, even Fuller shied away from relying too heavily on this argument.  See Fuller, supra note 16, 
at 815 n.23 (“This remark of Bufnoir’s cannot be taken too literally . . . .”); see also Kull, supra note 18, at 49 n.33 
(“None of these authors [citing the sterility of donative promises] argue that the gift promise is entirely ‘sterile.’  All, 
in fact, suggest some respects in which a gift promise might be at least modestly fruitful.”). 
28 Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 4. 
29 See Mark B. Wessman, Retraining the Gatekeeper: Further Reflections on the Doctrine of Consideration, 29 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 713, 819-20 (1996); id. at 820 (“Interdependent utility is a perfectly familiar phenomenon and is quite 
likely to be present in the context of true donative promises among family or friends . . . .”); Charles J. Goetz & 
Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261, 1272 (1980). 
30 Posner, supra note 16, at 412; see also Joseph Siprut, Comment, The Peppercorn Reconsidered: Why a Promise 
To Sell Blackacre for Nominal Consideration Is Not Binding, But Should Be, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1809, 1831-33 
(2003). 
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such as when businessmen exchange small tokens at the start of a business deal.31 Even if the 
initial gift exchange does not increase social welfare, the ensuing economic transaction that it 
facilitates very well might. 
More fundamentally, however, even if donative transfers were socially sterile, donative 
promises would still be socially valuable because they allow for beneficial reliance in advance of 
performance.  As Eric Posner explains, “A promise to give a gift enables the promisee to rely in 
anticipation of receiving the benefit and enables the promisor to defer performance until the 
funds or goods are acquired.”32 If a donee knows that a donor intends to give her a car at some 
future date, she can avoid the costs of purchasing a car on her own in the interim.  Beneficial 
reliance of this sort is made possible by the enforcement of the promise, because the donee can 
rest assured that her reliance will not be in vain.  Even if donative gifts were sterile, the legal 
enforcement of donative promises could still be welfare enhancing.33 
2.  The “Trivial” Rationale 
 
A second substantive argument against enforcing donative promises is that such promises 
are too trivial to merit legal recognition.  Donative promises are sometimes casual and 
insignificant—of the “I promise to take you out to dinner” variety.34 Allowing legal enforcement 
of donative promises might involve the court system in “a lot of trivial promises arising in social 
and family settings.”35 The exception to the consideration doctrine for charitable pledges has 
been justified by contrasting the trivial nature of most donative promises with “the large size of 
many charitable donations.”36 The consideration doctrine supposedly prevents the legal system 
from having to assume the administratively costly job of policing interpersonal squabbles.37 
However, even if it were true that many donative promises are too trivial to merit legal 
enforcement, the consideration doctrine is a curious way to deal with the problem.  A much more 
direct approach would be to refuse to involve the legal system in disputes in which only a small 
sum was at issue.  Moreover, there is little reason to assume donative promises tend to be 
relatively insignificant, or that the costs of litigating such promises would be particularly high.  
Many donative promises tend to be quite substantial—for instance, “[a] parent’s promise to 
finance a medical school education.”38 And even where small donative promises are concerned, 
 
31 See Wessman, supra note 29, at 820; Carol Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts 
Become Exchanges, and (More Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 310-11 (1992) (noting that the 
practice of “giv[ing] a little for the sake of the larger bargain . . . happens all the time among business dealers” and 
that “if someone does not give, the exchange may never get off the ground”); Gordon, supra note 17, at 995 (“Some 
promises are related to exchanges, are ancillary to bargains, but are not themselves given in exchange for some 
identifiable price. These promises have economic and social utility because they assist exchanges and promote 
economic activity.”). 
32 Posner, supra note 3, at 850; see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1267-71 (1980); id. at 1269 (“[T]he 
production of beneficial reliance is perhaps the principal social rationale of promising . . . .”). 
33 See Posner, supra note 16, at 411-14. 
34 See id. at 416-17. 
35 POSNER, supra note 14. 
36 See Posner, supra note 16, at 420. 
37 See Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 3; Posner, supra note 16, at 417. 
38 See Wessman, supra note 29, at 826; see id. (“The claim that gratuitous or donative promises are financially 
trivial is . . . empirically suspect.”). 
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as Goetz and Scott point out, “it is no less expensive to litigate most small contracts.”39 As a 
means of screening out trivial disputes, the consideration doctrine is both under-inclusive (since 
many donative promises are large) and over-inclusive (since many contracts are small).  
Additionally, promisees are unlikely to sue promisors for breach of trivial promises.  As Andrew 
Kull observes, litigation over a promise to take someone out to dinner “would be a freak 
occurrence.”40 Finally, the legal system already denies enforcement to promises—whether 
unilateral or bilateral—for which any injury is truly minimal.41 Thus, recourse to the 
consideration doctrine to screen out trivial promises is not needed.  
 
3. The “Unnecessary” Rationale 
 
A third substantive argument maintains that enforcement of donative promises is 
unnecessary because extra-legal sanctions will be sufficient to ensure performance.  For altruistic 
promisors who care about the well-being of their promisees, “the promisor may regard costs 
suffered by the promisee as equivalent to costs suffered by himself,” thus obviating the need for 
a legal sanction.42 Moreover, social norms against welshing may shame into performance even 
those promisors unconcerned about their promisee’s interests.  Therefore, some claim that legal 
enforcement of donative promises is superfluous. 
Yet arguments based on extra-legal sanctions hold no more validity than arguments 
claiming that donative promises are trivial or sterile.  First, even if extra-legal influences can 
ensure performance in most instances, this does not explain why legal remedies should be 
unavailable where such influences prove insufficient.  Second, extra-legal sanctions may also be 
more important than the law for most bargain exchanges.43 Sociological accounts have long 
recognized that businessmen “seldom use legal sanctions . . . to settle disputes”44 because “there 
are many effective non-legal sanctions,” such as norms of honesty, close ties between those in 
the same industry, and anticipation of future interactions.45 Third, extra-legal sanctions may 
prove ineffective to ensure performance when the promisor has passed away.  The promisor’s 
heirs or estate may be much less concerned with the promisee’s welfare, less influenced by 
norms of promise-keeping (since it was not their promise in the first place), and less likely to 
face social opprobrium from the relevant peer group.  Indeed, suits against promisors’ estates 
represent “[t]he overwhelming majority of suits to enforce [donative] promises.”46 
In sum, substantive arguments for the consideration doctrine fall short because the 
presence of consideration is a poor proxy for a promise’s value or society’s interest in enforcing 
 
39 Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1301. 
40 See Kull, supra note 18, at 56. 
41 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 995 (“[T]he law already screens out claims involving trivial injuries by awarding 
only certain kinds of damages. For example, suppose A and B mutually promise to meet each other for dinner. The 
mutual promises are valid consideration . . . .  However, the law declines to compensate with damages the slight 
injury suffered, and so the case is not worth pursuing.”) (footnotes omitted); Kull, supra note 18, at 57. 
42 Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 1304. 
43 See Gordon, supra note 17, at 994. 
44 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 55 (1963). 
45 Id. at 63. 
46 Kull, supra note 18, at 45-46; see id. at 46 (“The reason may be that unequivocal gift promises are highly likely to 
be performed, provided the promisor lives long enough; or that the recipient of a gift promise, feeling toward his 
benefactor something of the same altruism that motivates the promise, is likely to forgive a performance that the 
promisor subsequently comes to regret.”). 
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it.  Donative promises are not necessarily any less socially beneficial or significant than bilateral 
promises, nor is the legal enforcement of donative promises any less necessary. 
Existing accounts, whether substantive or formal, fail to offer a convincing rationale for 
not enforcing donative promises where the parties clearly intended the promise to be legally 
binding.  This lack of a coherent theoretical explanation for the consideration doctrine has 
plagued its application in courts of law.  
 
C.  The Morass of Current Doctrine 
As the previous sections demonstrate, the consideration doctrine lacks a compelling 
justification under existing theories.  Indeed, the two categories of justification for the doctrine 
often conflict.  While formal arguments suggest that any promise taking the requisite form 
should be legally enforceable, substantive arguments invite courts to further inquire into 
promises’ social usefulness.  This ambivalence has manifested itself in the doctrine, with some 
authorities favoring the former and others the latter.  The result is a confused state of affairs in 
which potential promisors face uncertainty about which donative promises will be enforced.  As 
one commentator noted: “The courts are not consistent in their application of the rule, partly 
because they are unwilling to enforce it strictly in all cases, and partly because they are often 
hazy in their understanding and knowledge of the topic.  All this leads to present uncertainty and 
doubt.”47 
Consider first the notion that courts will strike down promises backed by only trivial 
amounts of consideration.  Authorities fall into opposing camps on the subject.  According to 
traditional doctrine, so long as both sides of a transaction receive something from the exchange, 
the fact that one side receives something of much greater value is of no moment.48 Indeed, even 
if what one party gives up is of nearly no value at all but is only given for the sake of serving as 
consideration—so-called “nominal consideration”49 or “peppercorn consideration”—the 
exchange remains legally enforceable.  Thus, in 1932 the First Restatement of Contracts 
maintained that a promise by one party to transfer land valued at $5000 to another party in 
exchange for $1 is supported by “sufficient” consideration.50 This notion of consideration is 
highly formal—in the words of Oliver Wendell Holmes, then of the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court, “as much a form as a seal.”51 
Cases that follow the First Restatement prioritize the consideration doctrine’s formal 
justifications over its substantivist ones.52 In Scholes v. Lehman,53 for instance, the court cited 
 
47 Clarence D. Ashley, The Doctrine of Consideration, 26 HARV. L. REV. 429, 429 (1913).  Although written in 
1913, these words remain the view of many scholars today.  See, e.g., Wessman, supra note 29, at 809-812. 
48 See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 114 Eng. Rep. 330 (Q.B. 1842) (finding that the exchange of a life estate in property 
for a promise to pay £1 per year and keep the premises in good repair); see generally The Form of Bargain as 
Consideration in Contracts, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 896, 900-901 (1924) (collecting cases). 
49 See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 (“By the word ‘nominal’ we mean ‘in name only’—the purported 
consideration is given, but is not bargained for as part of an exchange. It is given as a mere pretense or formality.”). 
50 RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 84, ill. 1. 
51 Krell v. Codman, 28 N.E. 578, 578 (Mass. 1891); see also id. (“We presume that, in the absence of fraud, 
oppression, or unconscionableness, the courts would not inquire into the amount of such consideration.”). 
52 See, e.g., Smith v. Riley, No. E2001-00828-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 65, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2002) (“[A] stipulation in consideration of $1 is just as effectual and valuable a consideration as a larger sum 
stipulated for or paid.” (quoting Danheiser v. Germania Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 194 S.W. 1094, 1096 (Tenn. 
1917))); Lacer v. Navajo County, 687 P.2d 404, 410 (Ariz. 1983); Hart v. Hart, 160 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Iowa 1968) 
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Fuller’s Consideration and Form for the proposition that the consideration doctrine serves 
formal purposes: “a cautionary function of bringing home to the promisor the fact that his 
promise is legally enforceable and an evidentiary function, important in a legal regime that 
enforces oral contracts, of making it more likely that an enforceable promise was intended.”54 
Notably, the court omits any reference to Fuller’s description of donative promises as 
economically sterile—or to any other substantivist concerns.  Instead, the court opines that a 
court will not even consider consideration’s adequacy unless fraud or mistake is alleged.55 
Rejecting this formal approach, the Second Restatement suggests that courts look past the 
form of the transaction to make sure that gratuitous promises cannot be transformed into binding 
contracts by adding minimal amounts of consideration.  That the parties intend to be bound is not 
enough.  Transfer of “nominal” consideration in order to make a donative promise legally 
binding will not be respected.56 Because nominal consideration is not bargained for, but is 
instead merely a formality—that is, because the transaction is donative in substance, even though 
it is an exchange in form—it is not sufficient to render an agreement legally enforceable.57 In 
other words, courts should look through parties’ attempts to dress up a donative promise as an 
exchange.58 
Courts that follow the Second Restatement’s approach refuse to enforce promises they 
suspect of being gifts.59 In O’Neil v. De Laney,60 the court observed that a gross disparity 
between the value of a promise and the consideration offered in return for it signal that the 
parties “did not actually agree upon an exchange.”61 The use of nominal consideration is a 
“mere formality”62—a fact that, for the court, counsels against enforcement.  Many courts pay lip 
service to the notion that consideration’s adequacy is not to be scrutinized but then proceed to do 
 
(“The general rule is that consideration is not insufficient merely because it is inadequate. The legal sufficiency of a 
consideration for a promise does not depend upon the comparative economic value of the consideration and of what 
is promised in return. Even a nominal consideration . . . will sustain a promise if it is the consideration in fact agreed 
upon.” (quoting 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 102, at 445-46 (1964))). 
53 56 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 1995). 
54 Id. at 756. 
55 Id. (“One purpose the [consideration] requirement does not serve . . . is identifying fair exchanges. Unless fraud or 
mistake is alleged, ordinarily a court will not even permit inquiry into the adequacy of the consideration for a 
promise or a transfer.”). 
56 RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 71(1)-(2). 
57 See id. § 71, ill. 5 (“A desires to make a binding promise to give $ 1000 to his son B. Being advised that a 
gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers to buy from B for $ 1000 a book worth less than $ 1. B accepts the offer 
knowing that the purchase of the book is a mere pretense. There is no consideration for A’s promise to pay $ 
1000.”). 
58 See also 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 (agreeing with the Second Restatement); 1-3 Murray on Contracts § 
61[A] (same). 
59 See, e.g., Scott v. Scott, No. CA03-692, 2004 Ark. App. LEXIS 341, at *10 (Ark. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]wo deeds 
recited only nominal consideration, and it has been recognized that such a recitation does not destroy the 
transaction’s character as a gift.”); Noel v. Noel 512 P.2d 324 (Kan. 1973) (observing that the recital of “‘Love and 
affection and one dollar’” as consideration will not render a promise enforceable, as it “is characteristic of a gift”). 
60 415 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). 
61 Id. at 1265 (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts § 127, at 546 (1963)). 
62 Id. (quoting 1 Corbin on Contracts § 127, at 546 (1963)).  Interestingly, the quoted section of Corbin cites 
Holmes’s opinion in Krell v. Codman for support.  Yet Holmes never used the word “mere” to describe the effect of 
nominal consideration, and it is far from clear that Holmes disapproved of its use.  See supra note 51 and 
accompanying text. 
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just that, often by suggesting that a gross disparity in the value of promises exchanged indicates 
fraud or unconscionability.63 
Typical is Goodwin State Bank v. Mullins.64 The court starts with what seems like a 
categorical prohibition: “While the court will inquire to determine whether a contract is 
supported by consideration, it will not inquire into the adequacy of the consideration.”65 In its 
next breath, however, the court notes that an inquiry may be appropriate where “the amount is so 
grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court.”66 Significantly, the court makes no 
mention of the parties’ intentions.  That the promisor meant to be bound is immaterial; what 
matters is whether the transaction is such as to merit enforcement. 
Authorities are thus split between the First Restatement’s formal approach and the 
Second Restatement’s substantive approach.  Yet even authorities that generally insist that 
consideration be non-trivial often make exceptions for certain classes of promises.  For instance, 
option contracts and guarantee contracts represent two notable exceptions to the rule that 
consideration must be bargained for.  What explains this striking departure?  According to the 
Second Restatement, the exceptions for option and guarantee contracts result from their social 
utility.67 This social usefulness contrasts with the claimed sterility of ordinary donative 
promises.68 Since option contracts and guarantee contracts are socially valuable in substance, 
any imperfections in form can be ignored.69 Ironically, whereas these authorities normally 
prioritize substance over form, they are willing to accept form over substance for promises that 
they recognize as sufficiently valuable. 
While many courts agree that some promises deserve special treatment and can be 
exempted from the full consideration requirement, there is little agreement about exactly how 
special this treatment should be.  The majority position maintains that option and guarantee 
contracts are enforceable with only nominal consideration but refuses to enforce promises where 
consideration is promised but never delivered—so-called “sham” consideration.70 The minority 
position would enforce such contracts even with sham consideration.71 The Second Restatement 
endorses the minority approach, opining that option and guarantee contracts may be binding even 
 
63 See, e.g., Rose v. Lurvey, 198 N.W.2d 839, 841-42 (Mich. App. 1972) (relying on its power of equity to invalidate 
the transfer of a parcel of land for $1.05); id. at 841 (“It is a general principle of contract law that courts will not 
ordinarily look into the adequacy of the consideration in an agreed exchange. Equity will, however, grant relief 
where the inadequacy of consideration is particularly glaring.”). 
64 625 N.E.2d 1056 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
65 Id. at 1079. 
66 Id. 
67 RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 87, cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 88, cmt. a.; see also 1464 Eight, 
Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004) (adopting the Second Restatement’s reasoning). 
68 See 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17 (arguing that the doctrine of nominal consideration need not be applied to 
option and guarantee contracts because “[i]t is the area of the donative promise that justifies the invalidity of 
nominal consideration”). 
69 See also 1464 Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 101, 110 (Tex. 2004) (agreeing with the Restatement that an 
exception to the traditional consideration doctrine is warranted in the case of option contracts because of their social 
utility). 
70 See, e.g., Lewis v. Fletcher, 617 P.2d 834 (Idaho 1980); Berryman v. Kmoch, 559 P.2d 790 (Kan. 1977). 
71 See, e.g., 1464 Eight, Ltd. v. Joppich, 154 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2004); Real Estate Co. v. Rudolph, 153 A. 438 (Pa. 
1930); RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS §§ 87-88; see also 1 Murray on Contracts § 61 (4th ed. 2001) (“[M]ost 
courts hold that, upon proof that the recited amount has not been paid, the promise fails for want of consideration.”). 
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if the purported consideration never changes hands.72 A third position would require no 
consideration whatsoever; Corbin on Contracts argues that “[c]ommercial promises such as 
options and credit guaranties should be enforceable without consideration.” 73 
Each position thus takes a different stance on how much of a formality should be required 
to render an option or guarantee contract enforceable—nominal consideration, sham 
consideration, or no consideration.  At base, this conflict represents a disagreement about the 
persuasiveness of formal and substantive justifications for the consideration doctrine, and about 
how to make tradeoffs between the two.  Equitable concerns invariably put pressures on courts to 
relax the strict substantive approach in appropriate cases.  But because courts lack a single, 
compelling justification for the consideration requirement, they inevitably disagree about when 
(if ever) to make exceptions. 
Consider other deviations from the bargained-for requirement.  Some courts will enforce 
many unilateral promises without even a pretense of consideration.  Apparently the courts regard 
these promises as even more substantively valuable than option and guarantee contracts.  One 
author found the following examples: 
 
promises to waive nonmaterial conditions; promises to pay a prior indebtedness which was 
unenforceable because of the statute of limitations, the promisor’s minority, or bankruptcy; certain 
promises made in recognition of a benefit previously received by the promisor; stipulations 
regarding pending judicial proceedings; and firm offers by merchants, written waivers of claims, 
and certain negotiable instruments under the UCC.74 
And this list is not exclusive.75 
Predictably, not all courts share the same view on the value of various promises.  For 
instance, charitable donations are enforceable without consideration in many jurisdictions,76 
while in others they are not.77 Courts have carved out exceptions to exceptions, as doctrinal 
consistency and coherence are abandoned in favor of preferred policy objectives.78 And further 
compounding this uncertainty is the fact that courts sometimes misapply the doctrine.79 
The current state of the consideration doctrine is thus deeply confused: Nominal 
consideration will render a promise enforceable in some jurisdictions, but not in others.  In 
 
72 RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 87, cmt. c (“[T]he option agreement is not invalidated by proof that the recited 
consideration was not in fact given.”); RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 88, cmt. b (precluding inquiry into whether 
the purported consideration “was in fact given”). 
73 See, e.g., 2-5 Corbin on Contracts § 5.17; see Joppich, 154 S.W.3d at 110-11 (Jefferson, C.J., concurring) 
(agreeing with Corbin on Contracts that an option contract should be enforceable without any consideration). 
74 Gordon, supra note 17, at 1001-02. 
75 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 90(2), cmt. f (observing that courts routinely enforce charitable 
subscriptions and marriage settlements that are unsupported by consideration). 
76 See, e.g., Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974); see also RESTATEMENT (2D)
CONTRACTS § 90(2), cmt. f (“American courts have traditionally favored charitable subscriptions . . . , and have 
found consideration in many cases where the element of exchange was doubtful or nonexistent.”) 
77 See, e.g., Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989); Maryland Nat’l Bank v. 
United Jewish Appeal Fed’n, Inc., 407 A.2d 1130 (Md. 1979).  Compare Schwedes v. Romain, 587 P.2d 388 (Mont. 
1978) (refusing to allow a voidable or unenforceable promise to serve as consideration for a return promise), with 
RESTATEMENT (2D) CONTRACTS § 78 (“The fact that a rule of law renders a promise voidable or unenforceable does 
not prevent it from being consideration.”). 
78 See Wessman, supra note 29, at 810-12. 
79 See id. at 810 n.395 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdictions disallowing nominal consideration, formalities are not sufficient, except for certain 
categories of promises where they are.  And such jurisdictions disagree about which promises 
merit an exception and what sort of formalities will suffice.  Unless a new persuasive explanation 
for it can be made, the consideration doctrine is destined to produce conflicting results in the 
hands of courts that disagree with one another about the reasons for its existence. 
 
II. THE ROLE OF ANTI-COMMODIFICATION NORMS 
In order to explain our novel account for the consideration doctrine, we must first dispel 
two flawed assumptions of the traditional approaches.  The first flawed assumption is that any 
promisor who wishes to do so can back her promise with nominal consideration.  We need to 
defeat this assumption in order to show how the consideration doctrine differs from other formal 
requirements for distinguishing between binding and non-binding promises—such as a seal or 
writing requirement.  Their inability to appreciate how nominal consideration is a unique 
formalism has prevented scholars from valuing it over alternative formalisms.  
Our insight is that a nominal consideration requirement differs from alternative 
formalisms because of anti-commodification norms.  To invoke the consideration doctrine, 
contracting parties must point to some form of recompense explicitly offered in return for a 
promise.  In other words, consideration requires the appearance of a bargain.  Although it may be 
trivial in size, the consideration must still be present; the parties must be able to claim that the 
promise was given as part of an exchange.80 As such, the language required to satisfy the 
consideration doctrine “commodifies” a promise—that is, turns the promise into a commodity 
that is exchanged for another commodity.  Commodification of this sort can violate strong social 
taboos.  These taboos serve to make the consideration doctrine effectively unavailable in certain 
social circumstances, preventing parties from employing even the pretense of consideration. 
Scholars who write about commodification do not fully understand the phenomenon.81 
We lack a consensus understanding for what categories of transactions are subject to 
commodification and how these categories change over time.  Nevertheless, there is widespread 
agreement that social norms prohibit certain forms of transactions on account of their 
commodifying nature.  In this Part, we look to three branches of knowledge: (1) sociology and 
anthropology, (2) philosophy and political theory, and (3) economics and game theory.  
Although the three scholarly fields rely on different methodologies, they reach similar 
conclusions about the commodification phenomenon.  All three approaches support the existence 
of anti-commodification norms, and all three conclude that these norms govern transactions 
where the relationships between the transacting parties or the social messages sent by the 
transactions are more important than the desire to transfer goods or services.  On the other hand, 
when parties transact with the primary purpose of exchanging goods or services, anti-
commodification norms seldom apply. 
 
80 Even in the case of sham consideration, the parties must still claim that consideration is present. 
81 For a good sample of the recent controversies surrounding commodification, see Carol M. Rose, Whither 
Commodification? (Forthcoming; Partial manuscript on file with authors). 
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A.  Commodification in Sociology and Anthropology 
Sociologists and anthropologists have long recognized that market exchanges and gift-
giving represent drastically different social phenomena and that the norms governing the former 
are very different from those governing the latter.82 Whereas individuals engaged in a market 
context are expected to exhibit rational calculation based on personal self-interest, explicit 
considerations of monetary gain are taboo in relationships involving gifts.  Indeed, such non-
reciprocal interactions are said to involve a wholly different manner of thinking.83 
Although not all sociologists and anthropologists use the term commodification, there is 
widespread agreement that the language and behavior used for market exchanges are often 
inappropriate for gifts and for certain other forms of non-market transactions.  Anyone who 
conducts a gift transaction using the behavior reserved for market exchanges risks commodifying 
the transaction and thereby violating social norms. 
 What accounts for the dichotomy between gift transactions and market exchanges?  
While market exchanges are utilitarian in nature, serving a discrete purpose and requiring no 
prolonged relationship between the involved parties, gift-giving is a means by which two 
individuals establish an ongoing social intimacy.84 “The classic distinction between 
commodities and gifts is that while commodity exchange is concerned with establishing 
equivalencies between the value of objects, ‘gifts’ are primarily about relations between 
people.”85 The gift comes to represent the value of the relationship, instilling the gift with a 
“totemic” quality that distinguishes it from a regular market commodity.86 
As a result, gift-giving “must be based, or purport to be based, on affective or moral 
motives, and it may not be expressly required by the terms of the original transfer or viewed by 
the parties as the price of the original transfer.”87 Any outward sign that a gift has been assigned 
a monetary value, by either the donor or the donee, is strictly forbidden.88 For a donee to offer to 
compensate a donor for a gift would be to suggest that the donee has put a price on the gift—and, 
 
82 See, e.g., DAVID GRAEBER, TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY OF VALUE 32 (2001); LEWIS HYDE, THE 
GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 62-66 (1979); G. PALMER, ALTRUISM: ITS NATURE AND 
VARIETIES 60 (1920). 
83 See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 196 (1989) (“The personal, connected 
quality of giving may require the donor to employ modes of thinking quite different from those appropriate to the 
market.  Some believe that economic transfers call for detached, analytic deliberation in quantitative, cost-benefit 
terms which are inappropriate to the emotional and moral realm of gifts.”); Carol M. Rose, supra note 148, at 32 
(“[M]arketizing some human activities inappropriately makes us talk about them differently, and talking about them 
differently can make us think about them differently.”).  But see MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND 
FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 1 [1927] (1954 Trans. Ian Cunnison) (“The form usually taken is 
that of the gift generously offered; but the accompanying behavior is formal pretence and social deception, while the 
transaction itself is based on obligation and economic self-interest.”).  
84 See, e.g., Gretchen M. Herrmann, Women’s Exchange in the U.S. Garage Sale: Giving Gifts and Creating 
Community, 10 GENDER & SOCIETY 703, 710-11 (1996) (“‘It is the cardinal difference between gift and commodity 
exchange that a gift establishes a feeling-bond between two people, while the sale of a commodity leaves no 
necessary connection.’” (quoting LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY 56 
(1983)). 
85 GRAEBER, supra note 82, at 32. 
86 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contract and the World of Gift, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 821, 844-45 (1997). 
87 Id. at 843. 
88 See, e.g., PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 172-73 (1988 trans. Richard Nice). 
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by implication, the relationship.89 Similarly, a donor “cannot demand or require reciprocity 
without disqualifying her transfer as a gift”90 and thereby demoting the status of her relationship 
with the donee.   Thus, bargaining, which requires an articulation and discussion of the object’s 
value by both donor and donee, cannot take place within the gift-giving relationship. 
 Consequently, the social context of gift-giving is incompatible with the consideration 
form.  To claim that a gift promise is being exchanged for something in return—the essence of 
the consideration doctrine—is to violate the social rules surrounding the gift-giving relationship.  
Attempts to invoke the consideration form can commodify a transaction by suggesting that a 
price is being placed on the social interaction.   
 The distinction between gift-giving and market exchanges is not always clear-cut.  
Interactions that are ostensibly market-based may be constitutive of a relationship that requires 
its participants to adopt many of the outward indications of friendship.  A supplier may have a 
very cordial ongoing relationship with his distributor, requiring that he refrain from exacting as 
great profits as possible when he knows the distributor is pressed for cash.  Similarly, gift-giving 
may be employed as a means of facilitating future economic transactions.91 But the basic point 
remains that reciprocation and negotiation—the explicit articulation of and bargaining over 
value—are frequently precluded in some gift-exchange scenarios due to social norms. 
 A possible objection to the above might dispute whether gift exchanges are truly non-
reciprocal.  Certainly, the giving of any particular gift may be uncompensated in the sense that its 
transfer does not result in immediate monetary payment, but the gift may be given with the 
expectation of a return gift in the future, and such expectation of repayment is enforced through 
rigid social norms.  If A gives B a birthday present, B may be obliged to respond in kind.  As 
Marcel Mauss wrote in his classic treatise on gift-giving, “In theory such gifts are voluntary but 
in fact they are given and repaid under obligation.”92 Though accounting need not be one-for-
one, anyone allowing himself to fall too far in another’s debt risks loss of face or even ostracism.  
And even if the price of a gift is not a return gift, the donor may expect a return on her 
“beneficence” in the form of social esteem or some other non-material compensation.  In the 
words of one anthropologist, “When people act in ways that seem economically irrational, this is 
only because the values they are maximizing are not material.”93 Although the norms governing 
gift-exchange do not permit the participants to explicitly acknowledge that their behavior is 
motivated by self-interest, this may nonetheless be the primary motive.94 
89 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 86, at 845 (noting that a gift of cash to an intimate “would be regarded as bizarre, 
deeply insulting, or both”). 
90 Id. at 843. 
91 See Carol Rose, Giving, Trading, Thieving, and Trusting: How and Why Gifts Become Exchanges, and (More 
Importantly) Vice Versa, 44 FLA. L. REV. 295, 310-11 (1992) (noting that the practice of “giv[ing] a little for the 
sake of the larger bargain . . . happens all the time among business dealers” and that “if someone does not give, the 
exchange may never get off the ground”). 
92 MAUSS, supra note 83, at 1; see also id. (“The form usually taken is that of the gift generously offered; but the 
accompanying behavior is formal pretence and social deception, while the transaction itself is based on obligation 
and economic self-interest.”). 
93 GRAEBER, supra note 82, at 28-29 (describing a prevailing anthropological school of thought); see also 
BOURDIEU, supra note 88, at 177 (“Practice never ceases to conform to economic calculation even when it gives 
every appearance of disinterestedness by departing from the logic of interested calculation (in the narrowest sense) 
and playing for stakes that are non-material and not easily quantified.”). 
94 This description corresponds with our category of trust-building promises.  See Part II.D. 
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But while the underlying motivation of gift-giving may be self-interest, what is relevant 
for our purposes is that gift-exchange participants are barred from any outward acknowledgment 
of this motivation.  Social norms require a “formal pretense and social deception”95 that forbids 
any discussion of compensation between gift-exchange participants.  Even when the parties are 
transacting based on purely selfish motives, the gift-giving context prevents the articulation of 
these motives in the manner required to invoke consideration.  
Consider Walzer’s discussion of the Kula exchange among the Trobiander islanders, 
 
[The Kula] isn’t a ‘trade’ in our sense of the word: necklaces and bracelets ‘can never be 
exchanged from hand to hand, with the equivalence between the two objects discussed, 
bargained about and computed.’ The exchange has the form of a series of gifts. . . . [Contrast 
this with] what Malinowski calls ‘trade, pure and simple’ and what the islanders call gimwali.  
Here the trade is in commodities, not ritual objects; and it is entirely legitimate to bargain, to 
haggle, to seek private advantage.  The gimwali is free; it can be carried on between any two 
strangers; and the striking of a bargain terminates the transaction.  The islanders draw a sharp 
line between this sort of trade and the exchange of gifts.  When criticizing bad conduct in the 
Kula, they will say ‘it was done like a gimwali.’96
The Kula presents a prime example of the social restrictions on gift-giving transactions.  
Kula transactions are highly ritualized.  Even though Kula are given as part of an exchange, 
where the gift of a Kula imposes obligations on the recipient, the participants are precluded from 
explicitly voicing cost-benefit motives or consideration-type language.  The same phenomenon 
characterizes many gift-giving transactions in modern American society.  As Carol Rose writes, 
there are “occasions on which gifts are appropriate but cash is not.  Bringing a bottle of wine to 
the dinner party will be just fine, and may even be expected, but paying its price in cash would 
offend the host.”97 Just as the Kula exchange cannot be “done like a gimwali,” many modern 
forms of gift-giving preclude the use of market-oriented language and behavior.  Gifts may be 
exchanged in a ritualistic fashion, but the parties may not bargain over these transactions or 
explicitly acknowledge that the gifts are given in order to receive something in return. 
Not all theorists agree that affective and economic interactions occur in wholly distinct 
social arenas.  The sociologist Viviania Zelizer, for example, forcefully disputes this “Hostile 
Worlds” paradigm—her label for the dominant view of the gift-giving relationship among 
sociologists and anthropologists.98 Eschewing the notion that monetary transactions are 
impossible among social intimates or that market participants are incapable of affective 
relationships, she argues that real-world interactions cannot be reduced to a simple either/or 
dichotomy.  On the one hand, participants engaged in ostensibly “market behavior” often 
demonstrate a concern for one another that cannot be ascribed merely to economic self-interest.  
For example, a recent study of home care workers and their patients demonstrates that genuine 
bonds of friendship develop during what might be characterized as fee-for-service transactions.99 
95 MAUSS, supra note 83, at 1. 
96 MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 123-24 (1983). 
97 Carol M. Rose, supra note 81, at 16. 
98 Viviana A. Zelizer, Intimate Transactions, in THE NEW ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY: DEVELOPMENTS IN AN EMERGING 
FIELD (Randall Collins et al. ed. 2002), manuscript at 3 (on file with author).  
99 Deborah Stone, Care and Trembling, AMERICAN PROSPECT, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 61. 
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Though they undeniably engage in market behavior, it is impossible to accurately describe these 
actors as mere market participants.100 
And on the other hand, social relationships—even deeply intimate ones—often involve 
monetary transactions: “[P]arents give their children allowances, subsidize their college 
educations, help them with their first mortgage, and offer them substantial bequests in their wills.  
Friends and relatives send gifts of money as wedding presents, and friends loan each other 
money. Immigrants dispatch remittances to kinfolk back home.”101 To claim that all human 
interactions can be categorized as either “economic” or “social” is to ignore the complexity that 
attends real-world relationships.102 Instead, it is necessary to recognize that different types of 
monetary transfers take place within different types of relationships.103 
While such an admonition against reductionism is well taken, it does not undermine the 
basic premise of our argument: that explicit market-oriented articulations are off-limits in certain 
social relationships.  Though norms might permit—and even encourage—a parent to loan her 
child money to help with the down payment on a house, a parent who charges her child a 
premium “because you’re such a poor credit risk” would likely run afoul of taboos.  Transactions 
involving money may not per se be impossible among social intimates, but the conditions under 
which transfers may be proposed, discussed, and completed are much more limited than those 
acceptable for market transactions—even if the market participants do not treat each other 
merely as tools of personal gain.  That different forms of monetary transactions are permissible 
within different relationships does not defeat the basic argument, so long as contexts remain in 
which parties cannot specifically articulate consideration.  
To summarize, even if we reject the dominant “hostile worlds” paradigm, we can still 
conclude that social norms prevent parties from voicing consideration for certain non-market 
transactions.  The explicit quid-pro-quo language needed to invoke consideration risks 
expressing utilitarian motives and thus commodifying the relationship.  Non-commodifiable gift 
transactions often operate within a highly ritualized social space where the message conveyed by 
a gift is more important than the gift itself.  Muddying such gifts with consideration language can 
be viewed as rude and offensive, potentially undermining the feelings of trust and affection that 
form the basis of these non-market relationships.   
 
B.  Commodification in Philosophy and Political Theory 
Commodification in philosophy and political theory arises from the concept of spheres.  
Sphere-oriented theorists usually place market exchanges into one sphere and non-market 
transactions, or at least certain forms of non-market transactions, into another sphere.104 The use 
 
100 See Susan Himmelweit, Caring Labor, in Emotional Labor in the Service Economy, ANNALS OF AMER.
ACADEMY OF POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCI., Jan. 1999, 27, 32 (Ronnie J. Steinberg and Deborah M. Figart, eds., special 
issue) (“It is not so much that we are adding an element of the unpaid to the paid but that paid relationships 
themselves can include strong feelings and personal attachments.”). 
101 Zelizer, supra note 98, at 7. 
102 See id. at 6-7 (arguing that the idea “that money and intimacy represent contradictory principles whose 
intersection generates conflict” represents a “failure to recognize how regularly intimate social transactions coexist 
with monetary transactions”). 
103 See id. at 9.  See generally VIVIAN A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994). 
104 Theorists disagree about the number and classification of spheres.  For instance, Sandel argues for three spheres – 
for market goods, civic goods, and sacred goods.  Michael Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of 
Markets, 21 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 94, 112 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000).  In contrast, 
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of market-oriented behavior or language within the non-market sphere is deemed corrupting.105 
More specifically, these theorists “suggest that there are various ‘spheres’ (sometimes called 
‘modes’) of valuation, and an exchange is corrupting when it ignores the differences between 
these spheres of valuation and forces us to value all goods in the same way.”106 The value 
premises behind transactions in the non-market sphere are considered “incommensurable” with 
the value premises of the market sphere.  Mixing these value premises does “violence to our 
considered judgments about how these goods are best characterized.”107 
Even though the sale of non-market-sphere goods is impermissible, these goods may still 
be given as gifts as long as the transactions take place without the use of market-oriented 
language.  So whereas baby-selling is taboo, adoption is fully acceptable.108 Where the sale of 
organs is controversial, organ donation is laudable.109 And while prostitution is highly frowned 
upon, the free exchange of sexual favors is not equally condemned.  As long as the participants 
in a gift transaction eschew the bargain form, they can usually complete non-market sphere 
exchanges without violating social norms.  The key distinction is that parties cannot explicitly 
articulate consideration-type language or explicitly contemplate consideration-type motives.  A 
suitor may give jewelry in the hopes of receiving sexual favors, and the recipient may reward the 
gift by providing such favors.  Yet if the parties openly acknowledge that the jewelry is being 
exchanged for sex, or bargain over the transaction, the exchange is labeled prostitution and 
becomes taboo.  Similarly, adopting parents are allowed to pay for certain of the birth mother’s 
expenses, but not for the actual child.  Any suggestion that payments are made in order to induce 
the birth mother to give up her child would violate both social norms and the laws of most 
states.110 
At the risk of vastly oversimplifying the literature, we divide sphere-oriented theories 
into two general categories based on their rationales for keeping the spheres distinct.  First, 
consequentialist approaches worry about the corrupting force of market imperialism.  In the 
words of one scholar, “the application of market rhetoric to non-commodifiable matters coarsens 
our understanding of these matters, leading us into mistakes, loosening our moral grasp, and 
undermining our ties to others.”111 For instance, “[f]rom a conservative perspective, this is the 
problem with marriage.  Contract obligations in this intimate setting, it is said, could make the 
married partners talk and think about their individual entitlements, undermining the moral 
foundation of sharing that should permeate their relationship.”112 Ever since Titmuss’s classic 
work on blood donation, scholars have recognized that allowing market-form transactions into 
 
Walzer identifies a multitude of spheres, and claims that the delineation between these spheres differs amongst 
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oriented theorists define separate spheres for market and non-market transactions. 
105 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some Applications in Law, in 
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the non-market sphere can undermine the social norms and relationships needed for the non-
market sphere to function.113 Once some people are paid for their blood, blood donation may 
lose its expressive character as a duty of good community-members.  Or as Kimbrell writes, “If I 
buy a Nobel Prize, I corrupt the meaning of the Nobel Prize.”114 Similarly, conducting a 
friendship based on explicit cost-benefit analysis corrupts the meaning of the friendship 
relationship. 
 As an alternative form of consequentialist argument, Michael Walzer famously claimed 
that humans flourish within many different spheres of activity.115 Inevitably, human relations 
become unequal within individual spheres—as employers dominate employees, doctors 
dominate patients, and the wealthy dominate the poor.  Yet Justice requires that we not allow 
unequal power within one sphere to be leveraged into unequal power in other spheres.  No 
person should be able to dominate another within all spheres of human activity.  The non-market 
spheres must, therefore, be shielded from market logic in order to prevent disparities in wealth 
and market power from creating complete inequality across multiple spheres.  If the wealthy 
were allowed to explicitly purchase friendship, romance, or esteem; inequities in wealth would 
engender more widespread and insidious forms of inequality and injustice.116 
Whereas consequentialist arguments focus on the social consequences of market 
imperialism, dignity-oriented theories claim that subjecting non-market relationships to bargain-
form logic directly harms the object of this commodification.  Non-market goods and 
relationships are thought to be infused with an inherent dignity.  Subjecting these goods or 
relationships to market language and behavior represents a failure to accord them with the 
respect they reserve.  Elizabeth Anderson labels “the mode of valuation appropriate to pure 
commodities ‘use.’”117 She claims that “Use is a lower, impersonal, and exclusive mode of 
valuation. It is contrasted with higher modes of valuation, such as respect. To merely use 
something is to subordinate it to one’s own ends, without regard for its intrinsic value.”118 
Dignity-based arguments draw support from Kant’s categorical imperative against 
treating humans only as a means.119 Due respect for human dignity and autonomy requires that 
people be regarded as ends in themselves.  Expanding on this logic, modern dignity-oriented 
theorists have argued that a wide variety of goods—such as environmental resources—similarly 
deserve to be treated as ends in themselves.120 Viewing a good or relationship as an end 
prohibits bargaining in a manner that suggests the good or relationship is valued solely for its use 
potential.        
 Another form of dignity-based argument claims the use of market language denies the 
uniqueness of the object of the bargain.  “Market rhetoric assumes that everything can be traded 
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for everything else, and that through the medium of money, all is fungible.”121 For people or 
goods with inherent dignity, this assertion of fungibility offends the sense of uniqueness and self-
worth.  For example, your “children might be frightened and confused if they hear you talk about 
the market for babies.”122 No child should have to wonder about their market value; neither 
should a friend or intimate.  Bargaining over goods with inherent dignity results in “simplifying 
and flattening of all nuance, idiosyncrasy, and sentiment, not only for the speaker of this rhetoric 
but for the hearers as well.”123 Proper respect for non-market goods and relationships requires 
recognition of their non-fungibility.  Explicitly suggesting that these goods or relationships can 
be exchanged for something of value undermines their claims to uniqueness and inherent dignity.  
A favor rendered by a friend is not the same as a service purchased in the market and should not 
be treated as though it were. 
The commodification literature in philosophy and political theory is controversial.  Some 
market adherents call for removing barriers to commodification and expanding the scope of the 
market, while proponents of anti-commodification norms often wish to strengthen these norms 
through acts of law.  We lack general agreement about the proper scope of the non-market sphere 
or about the rationales for protecting the sphere from market rhetoric and logic.  Nevertheless, 
there is widespread consensus that norms shield at least some forms of non-market transactions 
from bargain-form language.  And few call for completely abolishing the non-market sphere; no 
one wants to reestablish slavery or to force intimates to explicitly negotiate every aspect of their 
relationships.  The literature from Philosophy and Political Theory adds support for the existence 
of anti-commodification norms and explains potential rationales for the function of these norms.   
 
C.  Commodification in Economics and Game Theory 
Economists seldom concern themselves with concepts like commodification.  A basic 
tenet of neoclassical economic theory is that individuals act as rational agents.  Almost by 
definition, rational agents would be unlikely to deny themselves the use of a legally binding form 
merely on account of social norms.  However, there are several branches of game theory 
literature which develop a concept similar to commodification. 
In order to explain how commodification works within the game theory literature, we 
categorize promises as being of four types based on the motives of the promisor.124 Our schema 
labels promises as either exchange-oriented, trust-building, status-enhancing, or altruistic.125 
Promisors make exchange-oriented promises in order to receive a defined benefit from promisees 
in recognition of their promise.  In contrast, promisors make trust-building promises in order to 
receive undefined benefits from a promisee.  These promisors typically seek to develop goodwill 
in order to later benefit from their relationship with the promisee.  Examples of trust-building 
promises include the lavish gifts law firms bestow on summer associates and the gifts 
businessmen make in the hopes of securing an eventual business relationship.126 Similarly, 
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status-enhancing promises are meant to build promisors’ reputations with the outside society.  
For example, promisors may seek a reputation for being charitable or for being a good family 
member, friend, or community leader.  Certain gifts to charities are among the most obvious 
forms of status-enhancing gifts, and the status-enhancing motive likely explains why so few 
large charitable gifts are made anonymously.127 Finally, altruistic promisors care about 
promisees and benefit from improving their promisees’ welfare.  In the language of economics, 
these promisors have interdependent utility functions with the promisees they wish to help.     
Promisors may operate out of a combination of two or more of these motives, but the 
general point remains that different motives will dominate for different transactions.  To the 
extent game theory sheds light on anti-commodification norms, these norms will primarily 
operate for trust-building and status-enhancing promises. 
Looking first to status-enhancing promises, promisors may wish to be viewed as 
charitable or to be seen as a good friends, family-members, or participants in other social 
relationships.  In other words, the status-enhancing motivation often involves promisors seeking 
to gain the appearance of being altruistic, whether the altruism is in general or is oriented toward 
a specific group or purpose.  But there is a difference between being viewed as someone who 
wants to be seen as charitable and being viewed as someone who actually is charitable.  Cost-
benefit type language can make it appear that a promise is being made for instrumental purposes.  
Phrasing a promise in bargain form can undermine the promise’s status-enhancing potential. 
Douglas Bernheim has developed a model which supports this result.128 Since one’s 
charitable nature is not directly observable, status-seekers try to signal their beneficence by 
making public gifts.  Their goal is to mimic the actions of those who actually are charitable.  As 
such, status-seekers must take care not to reveal their actual motivations by departing from the 
behavior of a truly altruistic donor.  If the status-seekers give the appearance that they are trying 
to gain something in return for their gifts, they may inadvertently reveal their status-seeking 
motives.  Hence, a specific agreement for a charitable recipient to publicize a gift or to grant the 
donor special privileges can diminish the amount of status the donor receives from the gift.  This 
is not to suggest that recipient organizations do not publicize gifts or grant donors special 
privileges.  However, a gift’s status-enhancing potential is maximized when the recipients make 
it appear that they are publicizing a gift of their own accord, rather than at the request of the 
donor.  The use of consideration language can render a promisor’s motivations in making these 
gifts too overt. 
 This problem is not as severe when a status-enhancing promise is exchanged for a dollar 
rather than for special privileges granted by the promisee.  Still, the public might wonder why the 
contracting parties deem it necessary to go to such lengths to secure a promise through law.  If 
the promisee believed the promisor to be truly charitable, the promisee should not worry about 
the promisor later reneging.  That a promisee seeks legal assurances that the promise will be 
fulfilled might be taken to indicate that the promisee suspects the promisor is status-seeking 
rather than altruistic.  Consequently, if the parties claim that a promise is being exchanged for 
something of actual value, the public may believe that the promisor is motivated more by the 
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desire to gain the item of value than by charitable inclinations.  But if the parties claim that a 
promise is being exchanged for a mere trifle, the public may believe that the promisee does not 
trust the promisor’s motives.  In either case, voicing consideration can suggest that a promisor 
merely seeks the appearance of being charitable rather than actually being charitable.   
The same conclusion holds when status-seeking promisors wish to be known for 
possessing qualities other than charity.  For example, Amihai Glazer and Kai Konrad have 
constructed a model in which donors seek to gain status on account of being wealthy.129 Since 
wealth is not directly observable, and since conspicuous consumption can only take one so far, 
these donors try to signal their wealth by making lavish donations.  These donations provide the 
promisors with a means of signaling that is both public and too expensive for the less wealthy to 
mimic.  The moderately wealthy may purchase a yacht if they truly enjoy yachting, but only the 
extremely wealthy are likely to donate massive sums without seeking personal benefit; only the 
extremely wealthy can donate on a whim.  The moderately wealthy are far more likely to take 
precautions to insure that their donations create the intended result. 
As such, when promisors appear to be seeking something in return for their donations—
when the donations are made using the bargain form—the donations may lose some of their 
potential to signal extreme wealth.  If the promise is exchanged for something of value, the 
promisor may be viewed as greatly desiring the item of value rather than as donating because the 
costs of doing so are low.  And if the promise is exchanged for something of negligible value, the 
public may wonder why the parties felt the need to make their promise legally binding; perhaps 
the promisee was concerned the promisor would no longer be able to afford the promise if her 
economic situation worsened before performance?   
Regardless of what form of status they pursue, status-seeking promisors cannot reveal the 
signaling motivations for their promises.  Articulating consideration or using cost-benefit 
language threatens to undermine the message these promisors wish to send.   
Similar conclusions follow for trust-building promises.  Economists have increasingly 
come to realize that legal sanctions are insufficient for monitoring long-term interdependent 
relationships.130 Courts simply lack the ability to verify that parties fulfill all aspects of an 
agreement in good faith.  Colin Camerer uses a signaling model to explain how parties can make 
trust-building gifts in order to signal their reliability as a contractual partner.131 The gifts serve 
to distinguish relationship-builders from opportunists, where relationship-builders sincerely 
desire a long-term relationship and opportunists seek to benefit by taking advantage of the other 
party’s trust.  By giving gifts that are expensive for opportunists to mimic, relationship-builders 
can demonstrate their commitment to the donee.   
However, if the donors try to negotiate over the terms of a gift or speak about a gift using 
cost-benefit language, they may be viewed as opportunists who are attempting to mimic the 
signals sent by relationship-builders.  Even suggesting that the promisee offer a penny in return 
for a promise in order to make it legally binding may suggest that the promisor believes the 
promisee needs reassurance of the promisor’s intentions.  The promisee may wonder if the 
promisor has a reputation for being unreliable that is unknown to the promisee.  When parties 
 
129 Amihai Glazer & Kai A. Konrad, A Signaling Explanation for Charity, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 1019, 1021 (1996). 
130 See, e.g., Oliver Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Comparative Contracting Perspective, 142 J. OF 
INST. & THEOR. ECON. 178 (1987).  More generally, the economics subfield of transaction-cost-economics is based 
on this observation. 
131 Colin Camerer, Gifts as Economic Signals and Social Symbols, 94 AM. J. SOC. S180 (1988). 
COMMODIFICATIONAND CONTRACT FORMATION 28
truly desire long-term cooperative relationships, they must learn to trust one another for promises 
that the law cannot enforce.  Beginning a relationship with a suggestion that a promise is not 
trustworthy unless it can be made legally binding raises questions, at the very least.  
Similarly, if promisees try to bargain over the conditions of a gift, they may be viewed as 
opportunists who want to take the gift without being interested in the long-term relationship.  
Any proposal that bargain-form language be used to invoke the consideration doctrine might be 
taken as evidence of insincere behavior.  In the words of Eric Posner,  
 
Attempting to bargain over a trust-enhancing gift is terribly improper, as it suggests that the 
donee is neither a cooperator who seeks a relationship nor a cooperator who does not seek this 
particular relationship, but rather an opportunist seeking to get a signaling gift at no cost to 
himself—something that would be in the interests of no one to admit.132 
The social norms against commodifying gift-giving transactions correspond with the 
signaling-based motives of status-enhancing and trust-building promises.  For both types of 
promises, articulating consideration can undermine the signals that the promises are intended to 
convey.  Game theory explains a process by which the norms against voicing consideration in 
gift-giving relationships may have arisen.  As successive generations of parties internalized the 
appropriate behavior for gift-giving relationships, this behavior may have begun to seem natural; 
parties may have forgotten the original rationale for the limitations on what behavior feels 
suitable for gift-giving transactions.  Even thinking about these transactions using cost-benefit 
rationales may have come to feel inappropriate.    
Of course, these results are somewhat speculative.  We do not claim that the 
consideration form is always unavailable for status-enhancing and trust-building promises.  But 
the evidence from Sociology and Anthropology strongly suggests that there exist categories of 
gratuitous promisors who cannot articulate consideration due to social norms, and the literature 
from Philosophy and Political Theory provides additional support for this conclusion.  The game 
theory models discussed in this section add both further support and another potential 
explanation for the proposition.  At the very least, the signaling-based motivations of trust-
building and status-enhancing promisors have probably played a role in the development of the 
norms against commodifying gift-giving relationships.   
 
D.  Drawing Conclusions from the Literature 
Controversy rages over the nature and scope of commodification.  Studies of the topic 
have yet to reach a point for us to accurately predict when norms will block specific transactions.  
As such, our discussion of anti-commodification norms has been necessarily vague.  We offer 
few specific examples and the examples we do give tend to the extreme—such as transactions 
over sex or transactions regarding ritual objects in tribal cultures.  We use these extreme 
examples because they best illustrate our argument.   
Nevertheless, we believe that anti-commodification norms also operate for routine 
transactions that occur throughout the economy.  We believe these norms frequently govern gift 
promises given to foster market exchanges as well as promises made within social relationships 
such as those between friends, family members, and neighbors.  Although the literature is not 
sufficiently mature to prove this point, we suspect that there are also a multitude of transactions 
 
132 See POSNER, supra note 14, at 10. 
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made within economic relationships—particularly among ongoing business partners—for which 
the explicit use of bargain-oriented language would be awkward, if not taboo. 
Despite the underdeveloped state of the literature, we can still reach a few conclusions 
about anti-commodification norms.  We can be fairly confident that these norms deter at least 
some parties from articulating consideration.  There is widespread agreement that social spaces 
exist wherein explicit bargaining is prohibited.  Moreover, the three branches of knowledge 
make similar predictions about the general types of transactions for which anti-commodification 
norms are likely to apply.   
Sociologists and anthropologists tell us that non-commodifiable transactions are highly 
ritualized, serving primarily to establish social intimacy or to solidify relationships, as opposed 
to merely resulting in a transfer of goods.  Similarly, philosophers theorize that anti-
commodification norms guard the non-market sphere—the norms function to prevent market 
forces from corrupting intimate relationships, to shield goods and relationships infused with 
inherent dignity from assaults by market-oriented language and logic, or to block those with 
market resources from purchasing power within other spheres of human activity.  Finally, Game 
Theory shows how voicing consideration in trust-building and status-enhancing transactions can 
undermine the signaling-based purposes of these transactions. 
Although the three branches of knowledge employ different methodologies, they reach 
similar results.  All three approaches conclude that anti-commodification norms govern 
transactions where the relationships between the transacting parties or the social messages sent 
by the transactions are more important than the actual exchange of goods or services.  When a 
promisor seeks only to give something of value to a promisee, anti-commodification norms do 
not usually come into play.  Instead, non-commodifiable transactions are ritual-oriented or 
signaling-based.  They operate within a realm of social activity in which market logic is 
subordinated to other purposes, where parties seek non-market values like friendship or esteem.  
Although the dividing lines are blurry, there exists both a market sphere where commodifying 
language is fully acceptable and a more relationship-oriented sphere where such language is 
taboo.  By enforcing only promises backed by at least nominal consideration, courts can limit 
legal enforcement to promises made within the market sphere while avoiding entanglement with 
the personal domain. 
Of course, even when norms frown on the use of consideration, some parties will 
inevitably ignore these norms and take whatever steps are required to make their promises 
legally binding.  Moreover, the content of anti-commodification norms is likely to change over 
time and amongst subcultures.  And consideration may be available through ritualized 
“gentleman’s agreements” even in circumstances where other forms of bargain-type behavior 
would be prohibited.  When looking beyond the extreme cases, we cannot know whether and to 
what extent anti-commodification norms actually apply.   
But this ambiguity supports the central premise of our paper.  We wish to dissuade courts 
from trying to determine the specific circumstances wherein promises backed by nominal 
consideration should be binding.  Instead of creating one rule for option and guarantee promises, 
another for interfamilial promises, and further rules for still other type of promises, we call for a 
single rule to be applied to all cases.  By making nominal consideration both a necessary and a 
sufficient condition for a promise to be enforced, we would rely on the parties to demonstrate 
when they are able to overcome any extant anti-commodification norms.  
 Without further analysis, we cannot evaluate the normative implications of the limits 
anti-commodification norms place on access to nominal consideration.  Looking to the principle 
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of honoring parties' intentions, it might seem like we should abandon the use of consideration 
and provide parties with a method for enforcing their promises that is more readily available.  
Yet, as the next two Parts will demonstrate, anti-commodification norms only block access to 
consideration in circumstances wherein parties should generally prefer to not have a means for 
making their promises legally binding.  In order to understand this counter-intuitive argument, 
we must first address the assumption that parties only choose to make their promises legally 
obligating when they actually desire the promises to be enforced.  The next Part shows how 
parties’ expressed intentions may not reflect their underlying desires.  
 
III. THE PROBLEM OF INEFFICIENT SIGNALING 
When starting from the principle of respecting parties’ intentions at the time of contract 
formation, the consideration doctrine is a bit puzzling.  The doctrine serves to deny legal 
enforcement even when the parties clearly wish their promises to be binding.  No matter how 
unequivocally the parties communicate a desire to be bound, the doctrine calls for ignoring the 
parties’ declared wishes unless consideration is present. 
 The previous Part demonstrated that anti-commodification norms block some parties 
from invoking nominal consideration.  Hence, even when courts enforce promises backed by 
nominal consideration, not all parties can make use of the consideration form.  To the extent that 
we rely on the consideration doctrine as a means for parties to bind themselves, the law will 
sometimes be unable to effectuate parties’ expressed wishes.  Under the traditional assumption 
that parties’ expressed wishes correspond with their true desires, our discussion of anti-
commodification norms would cast substantial doubt on the consideration doctrine.  After all, 
anti-commodification norms prevent many parties from invoking consideration even when they 
want their promises to be binding.  Instead of looking to consideration, perhaps we should seek a 
less-restrictive form, such as enforcing all promises where the parties declare in writing a desire 
for legal enforcement.  
 But the traditional assumption is flawed; parties stated intentions do not necessarily 
reflect their true desires.  Just because a promisor states her intention to make her promise 
binding does not mean she desires the option to be bound.  This idea can be illustrated by a 
simple example:  A professor worries that a few of her students may be confused and thus 
decides to hold an optional class session at 7 o’clock on a Friday morning.  When numerous 
bleary-eyed students show up, the professor assumes that more students were confused than she 
originally thought and pats herself on the back for being so generous—after all, the students 
would not have attended if the costs of doing so outweighed the benefits.  Though the professor 
sacrificed her own sleep in order to hold the extra session, she was glad to do so to assist her 
students, who obviously needed the extra help, since otherwise they would not have attended the 
class.   
The professor’s error is obvious.  If she schedules an optional class, her students may 
choose to attend it, but this does not necessarily mean they needed extra help.  The attending 
students may not require any additional assistance, but may merely seek to prevent the professor 
from thinking they are putting in less effort on account of their not attending the extra session.133 
Both the professor and the students may have been better off without the optional class.  The 
 
133 This result is particularly likely if the Professor grades even partially based on student effort.  But the result is 
possible as long as students suspect that the Professor might take her perception of their effort into account. 
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mere fact that students choose to attend the class once offered does not indicate that they wanted 
the class to be offered in the first place.  Contrary to the professor’s beliefs, the principle of 
honoring students’ desires does not support holding the optional class session. 
An analogous dynamic applies to a promisor’s choice of whether to secure her promises 
through law.  When promisors have the option to legally bind themselves, promisors who choose 
not to exercise that option may send a negative signal to promisees about their intention to 
perform.  Promisors who do not make their promises binding look insincere compared to those 
who do.  As a result, in order to avoid looking insincere, promisors may render their promises 
binding even though they would prefer not to.  When the option for legal enforcement is not 
available, on the other hand, there is no worry that the wrong signal will be sent.  Nothing about 
a promisor’s intentions can be deduced from the fact that her promise is not binding.   
Like the students who attend the make-up session, promisors may exercise the option for 
legal enforcement even if they wish the option didn’t exist.  The mere fact that parties choose to 
employ a legally binding form does not mean that they benefit from the existence of that form.  
When promisors have the option to legally secure their promises in order to demonstrate their 
sincerity to promisees, they may actually end up worse off than if no such option existed.  To 
respect parties’ true desires might actually require taking away the option for the legal 
enforcement of promises. 
This Part describes the intuitions behind the problem of inefficient signaling and outlines 
the assumptions we use to model the problem.  When inefficient signaling takes place, promisors 
may bind themselves even when they would prefer not to have the option to be bound.  The 
formal analysis proving this result can be found in Appendices A and B.     
Appendix A contains the first part of our formal proof.  The Appendix adapts a game-
theoretic model developed by Phillippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin.134 Their work is part of 
a well-known branch of scholarship building on an earlier piece by Rothschild and Stiglitz.135 
We do not present the Aghion-Hermalin model in full.  Instead, we show how the question of 
enforcing promises fits the conditions needed for the model to apply.  Appendix A forgoes 
equations and the direct use of mathematics.  Instead, the logic behind the model is explained 
through a series of graphs. 
Appendix B extends the Aghion-Hermalin analysis by presenting a model of our own 
design.  The Aghion-Hermalin model proves most of the results needed for our justification of 
the consideration doctrine, but the model was not designed with the consideration doctrine in 
mind and thus leaves gaps in our story.  Most importantly, the Aghion-Hermalin model is unable 
to show how the creation of a legally binding option can harm promisees as well as promisors.  
Appendix B remedies this deficiency.  Although based on Aghion and Hermalin’s work, our 
model in Appendix B is simplified in order to meet the space requirements of a law journal 
article.  The model should be viewed as an extension of Aghion and Hermalin’s work, not as a 
piece of analysis intended to stand on its own. 
Although the results of this Part depend on the formal models in the appendices for 
support, the body of the Part provides a conceptual explanation of the inefficient signaling 
problem.  We hope this explanation should suffice for most readers.  In order to situate our 
 
134 Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990). 
135 M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of 
Imperfect Information, 90 QUART. J. OF ECON. 629 (1976). 
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conceptual overview of the problem, we also explain the major assumptions behind our formal 
models of inefficient signaling.   
 
A. The Assumptions Behind Inefficient Signaling Spirals 
Before proceeding with our analysis, we need to specify four assumptions underlying our 
approach.  Although these assumptions are not strictly necessary for the conceptual argument 
contained in the body of this Part, we believe it important to explain the assumptions upon which 
we base the formal proof for our argument.   
Our assumptions are as follows: First, we adopt a welfare-maximization framework.  
Second, we employ an offer-acceptance model.  Third, we assume parties have asymmetric 
information.  And fourth, we define promises and contracts as containing only two terms.     
To begin with, we utilize a welfare-maximization framework, which seeks to maximize 
the overall benefit to all involved parties—that is, all promisors and promisees.  We use this 
framework because we lack cause for prioritizing the desires of specific promisors or promisees.  
When looking to whether parties would desire to have a legally binding option for a category of 
promises, we need a method for determining group preferences in cases where individual 
members of the group might disagree.  We assume that groups will—or at least should—choose 
the option that maximizes the overall welfare of the group.  We do not concern ourselves with 
the distribution of gains and losses amongst the members of a group.136 
As our second assumption, we employ an offer-acceptance model of promising.  We 
view promisors as rationally making offers in order to obtain some specific benefit.  This benefit 
can be something of monetary value offered by the promisee in return for the promise.  
Alternatively, the benefit can come from altruistic motives or from the desire to develop trust or 
status.137 Regardless, promisors fashion an offer and then look to see whether they can gain their 
desired level of benefit from making the promise.  In the case of market exchanges, a promisor’s 
offer would be followed by the promisee’s acceptance or rejection.  If the offer is rejected, the 
promisor can then fashion a new offer with different terms.  In the case of gratuitous promises, 
we model promisors as first deciding the minimum benefit they would need to receive in order to 
make promising worthwhile, and then looking to see whether they would actually receive this 
benefit from making the promise.  If the expected benefit falls below the minimum threshold, 
this counts as a rejection, and the promisors can then repeat the process by calculating a 
minimum threshold for a new promise/offer.  Of course, the offer-acceptance approach is not the 
only method for modeling promising.  The parties might instead bargain amongst themselves and 
jointly set the terms of the promise, or gratuitous promisors might start by calculating the 
expected benefit rather than the minimum threshold.  Nevertheless, we employ the offer-
acceptance model because it greatly simplifies our analysis and strikes us as a reasonable 
approximation of how many promises are made.138 
136 We do not claim that distribution is unimportant as a general matter.  When individuals differ with respect to 
morally relevant characteristics—such as their existing level of wealth—distributive concerns may trump the goal of 
welfare maximization.  But we do not view one’s status as a promisor or promisee or one’s probability of being able 
to fulfill a promise as morally relevant characteristics. 
137 See supra Part II.C. 
138 As the modeling task would be prohibitively difficult, we have not tested whether our results are robust to 
relaxing the offer/acceptance assumption.  But we see no reason for thinking that our results depend on this 
assumption. 
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For our third assumption, we specify that parties have asymmetric information.  
Specifically, we view promisors as having better information about the probability that they will 
be able to fulfill their promises than do promisees.  Since individuals are generally the best 
judges of their future actions, this assumption seems reasonable.139 Yet promisees only care 
about promises to the extent they view them as reliable.  A promisee will not generally offer 
much in exchange for a promise she believes is unlikely to be fulfilled.  Consequently, the 
benefit promisors receive from making a promise partially depends on their perceived reliability.  
This result applies to gratuitous promises as well as to exchange promises.140 Unable to assess 
promisor reliability directly, a promisee evaluates a promisor’s likelihood of performance based 
on the average reliability of all promisors with similar observable characteristics.    
Since promisors benefit from being viewed as reliable, it is worth asking why promisors 
with a high probability of performance cannot simply communicate that information to 
promisees.  The answer is that promisors with below-average probabilities of performance may 
mimic the communications made by more reliable promisors.  A promisor might tell a promisee 
that she is very likely to perform, but the promisee cannot know whether the promisor is 
speaking truthfully or is falsely attempting to increase the perception of her reliability in order to 
gain more from making the promise.  Only by taking concrete actions such as making a promise 
legally binding can promisors increase their perceived reliability. 
 Our last assumption is particularly important.  We only make this final assumption in 
order to demonstrate the conclusions of this Part.  Looking ahead to Part IV, we show how this 
assumption—that promises contain only two terms—holds only under certain conditions. We 
then show how this fact justifies the consideration doctrine. 
 With that preface, our fourth assumption defines promises and contracts as containing 
only two terms—(1) the size of the promise, and (2) the level of sanctions for breaching.  The 
size of the promise refers to the amount a promisor pledges to the promisee.  Equivalently, the 
term measures the value the promisee receives if the promise is fulfilled.  The level of sanctions 
refers to the negative consequences to the promisor in the case of breach.  Sanctions include both 
any damages imposed by law and any stigma that would result from social norms against breach.  
In order to build the models described in this Part, we assume that these terms completely define 
the content of all promises and contracts.   
 We make a few additional assumptions when constructing the formal models in our 
appendixes, but those additional assumptions are less important for understanding the intuitions 
behind our results.141 
139 There may be circumstances in which the promisee has better information about the promisor’s likelihood of 
performance—such as when the promisee can aggregate information across numerous similarly situated promisors 
and the promisor does not have access to this information.  Yet exceptions of this sort should be rare. 
140 For both trust-building and status-enhancing gratuitous promises, the promisee and the outside society are more 
likely to respect promises viewed as reliable over promises viewed as likely to result in default.  Being perceived as 
reliable results in an immediate benefit, as the promisors can gain more trust or status for the same cost.  The picture 
is more complicated for altruistic promisors, but even these promisors care about their perceived reliability to the 
extent they wish their promisees to engage in beneficial reliance – which is the primary purpose for making an 
altruistic promise to deliver a future benefit, rather than merely conveying that benefit at the future date. 
141 It is also worth noting another assumption underlying our analysis – that promisors will not signal through other 
means when prevented from making their promises legally binding.  As Aghion and Hermalin write, supra note 133, 
at 404, it remains uncertain “whether restricting only a subset of signals can improve efficiency.”  If promisors 
responded to the lack of a legally binding option by hiring the mob to enforce their promises, this outcome would 
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 B. A Conceptual Explanation of Inefficient Signaling Spirals 
As a consequence of asymmetric information, promisors may be more or less reliable 
than they are perceived to be.  Promisors whose actual reliability exceeds their perceived 
reliability may seek means for convincing promisees of their greater-than-average likelihood of 
performance.  Given the option of having their promises legally enforced, these promisees might 
agree to bind themselves.142 There are costs to entering a legally binding form.  The world is 
unpredictable and no promisor can be completely certain that she will still wish to fulfill her 
promise at the appropriate future date.  Securing a promise as a binding contract forces the 
promisor to bear costs in the event that she is unable—or unwilling—to perform.  Nevertheless, 
the contractual form may still be attractive when the benefit from increasing perceived reliability 
exceeds the cost of potentially paying legal damages. 
Following this logic, the conventional accounts claim that parties should be allowed to 
legally bind themselves because promisors will only exercise this option if the benefits of doing 
so exceed the costs.  Thus conceived, the existence of a legally binding form does not influence a 
promisor’s wishes—it merely effectuates them.  But what this account ignores is that creating a 
legally binding form can diminish the perceived reliability of promises that are not made 
pursuant to that form.  
Imagine a group of promisors with an average probability of performance of 80%.  Some 
promisors will have a higher likelihood of performance, and others will have a lower one, but 
promisees, unable to distinguish relatively reliable promisors from unreliable ones, will view any 
member of the group as having an expected likelihood of performance of 80%.  Now imagine 
that some of these promisors secure their promises as legally binding contracts while others do 
not.  All else being equal, the promisors who take advantage of the legally binding option should 
have a lower-than-average chance of default.  This is because promisors with a relatively low 
probability of default can enter a legally binding form with far lest cost, as there is less chance 
that they will end up being subject to legal sanctions.  Once the most-reliable promisors choose 
to bind themselves, the remaining pool of (non-bound) promisors will be viewed as having an 
increased average likelihood of default.  In other words, allowing relatively reliable promisors to 
 
clearly be worse than the inefficient signaling spirals created by legal enforcement.  Promisors might conceivably 
engage in a variety of costly behaviors designed to signal their reliability. 
 Yet making a promise legally binding is an exceptionally strong signal.  To a large extent, the prospect of 
paying expectation damages effectively raises a promisor’s reliability to 100%.  Factoring in litigation costs lowers 
the promisees eventual recovery, but also provides an additional deterrent to promisors.  Only alternatives like mob 
enforcement are likely to have anywhere near this strength, and we doubt that more than a tiny fraction of promisors 
will employ alternatives of this sort.  As such, we feel reasonably comfortable modeling promisors as lacking 
alternative signals. 
 Moreover, looking ahead, promisors who are willing to use extreme alternative forms of signaling are 
unlikely to avoid articulating consideration merely on account of anti-commodification norms.  As we discuss in 
Part IV.C.1, infra, the consideration doctrine makes a legally binding option available for promisors who care 
sufficiently about securing their promises to ignore any taboos against the use of bargain-form language.  The set of 
promisors who will be deterred by anti-commodification norms despite being willing to employ costly alternatives 
to legal enforcement, is likely to be sufficiently small so as to not be worth noticing.   
142 This result corresponds with Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEG.
STUD. 401 (1991).  Yet Shavell’s model only include two types of promisors—sincere promisors and masqueraders 
who have no intention of performing.  As such, Shavell’s conclusions are directly opposite to ours.  We owe Shavell 
a debt of gratitude for inspiring our own analysis, but his model is ultimately flawed do to its failure to recognize 
that even sincere promisors can differ with respect to their probability of performance.    
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differentiate themselves from the general group will lead promisees to assign a reduced 
likelihood of performance to any promisors who refuse to employ the legally binding form.   
 
This process can create a harmful spiral.  If promisors with a 90% chance of performance 
sign contracts in order to differentiate themselves from a group with an average performance rate 
of 80%, the remaining members of the group might be seen as having only a 70% chance of 
performance (the average probability of the now-smaller group).  This reduced assessment of 
reliability might then cause the promisors with an 80% chance of performance to sign contracts 
in order to differentiate themselves from the new group average of 70%, thereby further reducing 
the assessed reliability of the remaining members of the group.  Continuing the pattern, 
promisors with a 70% chance of performance might sign contracts in order to differentiate 
themselves from the new 60% average, and so on.  Figure 1 depicts this process pictorially. 
In this fashion, promisors can essentially be forced into adopting a legally binding form.  
Even when many, or even most, of the promisors would prefer for there not to be a legally 
binding option, once that option exists the promisors may feel obliged to exercise it.  
Consequently, promisors may well prefer not to have the option to bind themselves. 
Not Bound Bound
<50%
Step 1: No promisors 
are bound  
Step 2: Promisors with 
>80% likelihood of 
performance choose to 
bind themselves  
Step 3: Promisors with 
70-80% likelihood of 
performance choose to 
bind themselves 
Step 4: Promisors with 
60-70% likelihood of 
performance choose to 
bind themselves 
Average likelihood of 
performance: 80%
Remaining avg.: 70%
Remaining avg.: 60%
Remaining avg.: 40%
Figure 1. The Signaling Spiral
All 
<80%
<70%
60-70%
70-80%
>80%
>80%
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As Ian Ayres describes the inefficient signaling phenomenon, the “inefficiency of 
signaling stems not only from the efforts of [reliable promisors] to signal but also from the 
efforts of [unreliable promisors] to falsely match those signals which cause the [reliable 
promisors] to run even further away from the efficient contracting point.”143 Ayres continues by 
analogizing inefficient signaling to Dr. Seuss’s parable about the Sneetches: 
 
High-status Sneetches had stars on their bellies and low-status Sneetches did not.  As the tale 
unfolds, vast inefficiencies are generated as the low-status Sneetches try to match the high-
status ones by affixing stars to their bellies and the high-status Sneetches try to further 
distinguish themselves by then removing their stars.  The moral of the story is that finding 
credible signals may be extremely hard and that the mere attempt to distinguish yourself 
whether or not it succeeds can generate social inefficiencies.144 
In addition to harming promisors, the creation of a legally binding form can also harm 
promisees.  Promisors should only make promises when their benefit from doing so exceeds their 
costs.  Regardless of whether a promisor seeks something of material value in exchange for a 
promise, seeks increased trust or status, or seeks to altruistically enhance the welfare of a 
promisee, the promisor will only bind herself when doing so can be expected to result in her 
obtaining enough additional benefit from promising to compensate for the costs of potentially 
paying sanctions if she ultimately needs to default.  In the absence of signaling motivations, 
promisors should size their promises so as to maximize their expected benefit from promising 
while minimizing their costs.   
By reducing the perceived reliability of promisors who choose not to bind themselves, 
signaling spirals force promisors to either reduce their expected benefits or else increase their 
expected costs.  If the promisors refuse to bind themselves, they will receive less benefit from 
promising on account of their lower perceived reliability.  But if the promisors do choose to bind 
themselves, they will thereby increase their costs due to the possibility of needing to bear legal 
sanctions.  In either case, signaling spirals can make promising less attractive to promisors. 
Some promisors will decide that this less attractive value proposition no longer justifies 
promising.  When the benefits of promising are reduced, the benefits may no longer exceed the 
costs, causing some promisors to leave the promising game altogether.  Other promisors will 
reduce the size of their promises, so as to lower their potential costs if they end up needing to pay 
damages.  Through a combination of these reactions, signaling spirals can reduce the overall 
value of what promisors offer to promisees.  In this manner, signaling spirals can harm 
promisees as well as promisors. 
This Part has attempted to provide a conceptual overview of the logic behind signaling 
spirals.  Again, we prove these results through formal models in the appendices.  But it is 
important to realize that not all signaling spirals are inefficient.  The goal of this Part was to 
demonstrate that allowing promisors to bind themselves does not necessarily benefit either 
promisors or promisees.  In some instances, even parties who choose to make their promises 
legally obligating would prefer not having the option to do so.  But in other circumstances, the 
benefits of allowing promisors to back their promises through law should exceed the costs.   
 
143 Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 400 (1991).  Ayres is 
discussing corporate charters rather than contract formation, but his description of the Aghion-Hermalin model for 
inefficient signaling remains valid. 
144 Id. (describing a parable from DR. SEUSS, THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES 1-25 (1961)). 
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Without further analysis, we cannot distinguish the circumstances where parties would 
benefit from having a legally binding option from the circumstances where providing this option 
would be harmful.  All we can know is that the mere fact that parties take advantage of a legally 
obligating form does not mean that they benefit from the existence of that form.  The traditional 
assumption that parties expressed intentions necessarily reflect their true desires is flawed.  There 
is a difference between one’s actions when confronted with a legal rule and one’s preferences for 
what the legal rule should be.        
 
IV. TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONSIDERATION DOCTRINE 
We have now demonstrated the flaws in two assumptions underlying traditional accounts 
of the consideration doctrine: First, not all parties who might wish to do so can back their 
promises with nominal consideration.  Second, the mere fact that parties utilize an option for 
making their promises legally binding does not imply that they desire the existence of this 
option.  Part III argued that parties’ expressed intentions do not necessarily conform to their 
underlying desires.  Yet if we cannot look to parties’ expressed intentions for determining 
whether they want to be bound, to what can we look?  Must we abandon any hope that contract 
law might honor parties’ wishes? 
Our new account of the consideration doctrine synthesizes the analysis from the previous 
two Parts.  On a general level, we advocate using nominal consideration as a mechanism for 
determining when bargaining is limited by anti-commodification norms.  Although the dividing 
lines are blurry, anti-commodification norms separate a market-oriented sphere of interactions in 
which parties can bargain over their promises from a relationship-oriented sphere in which 
parties face severe limitations on their ability to bargain.  We argue that the law should only 
enforce promises made within the market-oriented sphere.  When anti-commodification norms 
prevent parties from bargaining, the law should not allow these parties to bind themselves. 
Our account is in some respects similar to the substantive theories discussed in Part I.  
Yet where substantive theorists have called on courts to strike down promises backed only by 
nominal consideration, we would enforce these promises.  The reason substantive theorists wish 
to deny enforcement to promises backed only by nominal consideration is to prevent gratuitous 
promisors from binding themselves by dressing their promises in bargain-form language.  But as 
we have shown, nominal consideration will generally be unavailable to promisors operating 
wholly within the non-market sphere.  To the extent that substantive theorists seek only to block 
enforcement of promises made within the relationship-oriented sphere, they need not oppose the 
enforcement of promises backed by nominal consideration. 
As we argued in Part I, substantive accounts are mistaken in their belief that 
consideration-backed promises are inherently more deserving of legal support.  So why then do 
we favor denying enforcement to promises that lack even nominal consideration?  Our answer is 
formalist in nature.  We justify nominal consideration as the best mechanism for determining 
which promises parties actually desire to make binding. 
Our game theory analysis described in Part III relied on the assumption that promises and 
contracts contained only two terms.  Yet this assumption does not hold for promises made within 
the market-oriented sphere.  When parties are able to bargain—where anti-commodification 
norms do not apply—they are also able to design contracts using more than two terms.  In 
addition to the terms previously discussed—the size of the promise and the level of sanctions—
these parties should also be able to specify their promises’ scope and level of return payments.  
COMMODIFICATIONAND CONTRACT FORMATION 38
We will define both of these terms later in this Part.145 In brief, the “scope” of a promise refers 
to the circumstances under which a promisor’s performance will be excused.  And “return 
payments” refers to what a promisee gives in exchange for a promise—in other words, the 
consideration.  
Crucially, our analysis from Part III does not apply when parties can negotiate over a 
promise’s scope and return payments.  When parties are able to overcome anti-commodification 
norms and dress their promises as bargains, we can generally conclude that the parties would 
benefit from having their promises legally enforced.  For promises made within the market-
oriented sphere, the fact that parties choose to use a legally binding form generally does indicate 
that they desire the existence of this form.   
Our account thus seeks to distinguish between the market- and relationship-oriented 
spheres, not for substantive reasons, but for formalist purposes.  Only within the market-oriented 
sphere can a form like nominal consideration provide parties with an effective mechanism for 
communicating when they truly wish to be bound. 
To complete our argument, we turn last to promises made wholly within the relationship-
oriented sphere—promises for which anti-commodification norms prevent the parties from using 
even a pretense of the bargain form.  For these promises, legal formalisms cannot adequately 
determine the parties’ actual desires.  Unlike market-oriented promisors, relationship-oriented 
promisors cannot negotiate over a promise’s scope or its level of return payments.  With only 
two terms available for characterizing their promises, these parties are subject to the inefficient 
signaling spirals described in Part III.  When parties are unable to bargain, any mechanism we 
might give them to legally bind themselves could end up enforcing promises that the parties 
would prefer to leave non-binding. 
Moreover, a number of tie-breaking factors further support our position of not enforcing 
promises where anti-commodification norms block the use of nominal consideration: These 
promises are administratively costly to enforce.  And, to the extent that we believe the 
philosophical arguments against commodification, enforcing these promises might advance the 
forces of market imperialism, damaging non-market values and relationships.  Perhaps most 
importantly, relationship-oriented promises are made within a complicated web of personal 
interactions and interlocking obligations.  Due to the same anti-commodification norms that 
make bargaining impossible, many of the parameters of these relationships are unstated.  
Enforcing these promises might cause injustice to the parties by making some commitments 
legally obligating while other, unstated, return commitments remained outside the legal domain.  
Combined with our inability to know whether parties actually desire non-market promises to be 
enforced, these tie-breaking factors call strongly against providing legal support for promises not 
backed by even nominal consideration. 
 To summarize, unlike the substantive accounts that seek to deny enforcement to 
gratuitous promises, we value the consideration doctrine for its potential to identify the 
circumstances in which bargain-form language is socially permissible.  Only when parties can 
bargain without violating anti-commodification norms do we accept the formalist position that 
the law should honor parties’ intensions as expressed at the time of contract formation.  For only 
within this market-oriented sphere can we conclude that parties who utilize a form like nominal 
consideration actually desire to make their promises binding. 
 
145 III.B. 
COMMODIFICATIONAND CONTRACT FORMATION 39
A. Relaxing the Assumption that Promises Have Only Two Terms 
 
The consideration doctrine creates an option for the legal enforcement of promises in 
contexts where parties can voice consideration and denies this option where norms block the use 
of consideration.  The doctrine must thus be justified against two potential alternatives—denying 
enforcement to a larger set of promises and permitting a larger set of promises to be enforced.  
This section argues in favor of allowing parties to make certain gratuitous promises enforceable 
against the alternative of denying enforcement to all gratuitous promises.  In other words, the 
section argues for enforcing promises backed only by nominal consideration as opposed to 
requiring substantial consideration or an even more-restrictive legal form.  The next two sections 
complete the analysis by arguing against enforcing promises where parties cannot voice even 
nominal consideration. 
When describing inefficient signaling spirals in Part III, we assumed that promises 
consisted of only two terms—the level of sanctions and the size of the promise.  Inefficient 
signaling occurred when the promisors attempted to signal their reliability by making their 
promises legally binding (by increasing their level of sanctions).  Since increasing the level of 
sanctions raises the costs to promisors of making a promise, these costs must be offset by 
adjustments made to the other contracting terms.  Under our previous assumption of only two 
terms, promisors decreased the size of their promises whenever signaling caused them to make 
their promises legally binding.  These reductions in the size of promises diminished welfare, as 
they caused promisors to depart from their optimal bundle of terms for signaling purposes. 
If we relax the assumption of only two contracting terms, promisors can adjust more than 
just the size of a promise when compensating for raising the level of sanctions.  In addition to the 
size of a promise and the level of sanctions, promises may consist of two other terms—the 
promise’s scope and its level of return payments.  
Scope relates to the conditions under which performance will occur.  A promisor might 
qualify his promise by listing the circumstances that will lead to non-performance—for example, 
“I promise to take you to Disneyland, unless I lose my job, the Red Sox make the playoffs, or a 
relative dies.”  By narrowing the scope of a promise, promisors reduce the costs to themselves of 
making the promise and the value the promise confers on the promisees.  In the event that a 
scope-reducing event takes place, the promisor need neither fulfill the promise nor be subject to 
sanctions.  In contrast, a reduction in the size of a promise might entail taking the promisee to a 
local amusement park instead of to Disneyland.  Size adjustments affect the value of what is 
delivered under all circumstances, while scope adjustments affect the conditions under which the 
promise must be carried out. 
“Return payments” is our term for anything offered by the promisee in order to induce 
the promise—in other words, the consideration.  For promises made as part of a market 
exchange, the promisor’s desire for return payments forms their primary motivation for entering 
into the promise.  Without return payments, exchange-oriented promises would not take place.  
Although gratuitous promisors are primarily motivated by something other than the desire for 
return payments, they may still value return payments. 
For the purposes of this section, we evaluate return payments as a promise term rather 
than as a mechanism for inducing promisors to make a promise.  As a promise term, return 
payments can be adjusted in order to trade off with the other terms.  If the parties wish to raise 
the level of sanctions without reducing the size of the promise, they can instead raise the level of 
return payments.  Consequently, as we use the term, return payments must be different in nature 
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from what the promisor offers the promisee.  If a promisor is offering to give the promisee a 
hundred dollars at a future date, a return payment cannot consist of the promisee giving ten 
dollars back at the same date.  In this case, offering the return payment would be equivalent to 
reducing the size of the promise by ten dollars.  In contrast, a promisee’s offer to deliver ten 
dollars now as partial consideration for a future promise of a hundred dollars could constitute a 
return payment.  The key difference between these scenarios is that the parties might have 
different preferences for how they value money now as opposed to money at the future date.  
Return payments must be different in nature from the promised goods or services; the parties 
must have different preferences for tradeoffs between the return payments and the size of the 
promise.  If the parties have the same preferences for tradeoffs between the return payments and 
the promised goods or services, adjustments to return payments would be equivalent to adjusting 
the size of the promise.  Only when return payments are different in nature from the promised 
goods or services can they function as a separate term.   
Our argument that parties who can invoke nominal consideration are not subject to 
inefficient signaling spirals is based on two claims.  First, the potential for offering return 
payments and scope adjustments alleviates the harm from this type of signaling.  Second, there is 
a substantial overlap between the contexts in which parties can articulate consideration and the 
contexts in which parties can make return payments and scope adjustments.  Where anti-
commodification norms prevent the use of consideration, the same norms will usually block 
parties from making return payments or scope adjustments.  As such, signaling spirals will 
typically only be costly when consideration is unavailable. 
 
1.  The Effects of Multiple Terms 
In the absence of signaling considerations, promisors should size their promises so as to 
minimize their costs while maximizing the value conferred on their promisees.  The promisors 
should likewise select a level of sanctions that minimizes their costs while maximizing value to 
their promisees.  Promisors only depart from this optimal bundle of terms in order to signal their 
reliability.  When signaling leads promisors to raise their level of sanctions above the optimal 
level (by making their promises legally binding), the promisors must compensate by adjusting 
the other terms of their promise so that their costs do not exceed the benefit they receive from 
promising. 
Under our previous assumption of only two terms, signaling-based increases in the level 
of sanctions forced promisors to reduce the size of their promises.  These departures from the 
promises’ optimal sizes create harms for both promisors and promisees. 
In most promises, transferring the promised goods or services increases value for the 
promisee more than it decreases value for the promisor.  This result is most clear for exchange-
oriented promises.  Exchange-oriented promisors should only offer their promised goods or 
services if they value them less than what the promisees offer in return.  Similarly, the promisees 
should only accept a promise if they value what is promised above what they give up in 
exchange for the promise.  That promisees and promisors have different value functions is what 
makes exchanges welfare-enhancing.  This value-creating function of market exchanges lies at 
the heart of economic theory. 
Altruistic promises present a more complicated picture.  Nevertheless, promisors should 
only promise if they prefer the promisee to have the promised goods or services rather than 
maintaining possession themselves.  When we combine the value promisors receive from 
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interdependent utility with the value promisees gain from receiving the promise, altruistic 
promises create value just as market exchanges do.146 
For both altruistic and exchange-oriented promises, transferring the promised goods or 
services creates value for society.  Whether the same result holds true for trust-building and 
status-enhancing promises is unclear, as we will discuss further in the next section.  However, as 
we explained previously, promisors making trust-building and status-enhancing promises will 
often be unable to articulate consideration.147 This section argues for enforcing gratuitous 
promises where parties can voice consideration against the alternative of not enforcing any 
gratuitous promises.  As such, for the purposes of this section, we can ignore trust-building and 
status-enhancing promises.  The majority of promises for which consideration is socially 
available will be dominated by altruistic or exchange-oriented motives.  For ritualized or 
signaling-based promises, the transfer of goods or services plays a secondary role to the 
messages the promises convey.  In contrast, altruistic and exchange-oriented promises are 
primarily concerned with the actual transfer of the goods or services.  For these promises, the 
transfer of goods or services from the promisor to the promisee creates value.     
 The opposite relationship holds for return payments.  At a minimum, we have no reason 
to think that promisees value the goods or services offered as return payments more than 
promisors do.  If money is used as a return payment, for example, we might assume that the 
parties value the money equally.  Consider a promisor who offers to drive a promisee to the 
airport.  If the promise were made legally enforceable, the promisor might need to reduce the 
size of the promise in order to compensate for the costs of entering the legally binding form.  
Perhaps the promisor would offer to drive the promisee only to the nearest bus station, forcing 
the promisee to take the bus the rest of the way to the airport.  Since the promisor would have 
been willing to drive the promisee all the way to the airport in the absence of sanctions, we can 
assume it costs less for the promisor to drive the promisee to the airport than it does for the 
promisee to take the bus.  Hence, if return payments were available, the promisee might offer ten 
dollars in exchange for the promisor’s driving her all the way to the airport.  If the parties can 
agree on a return payment that can induce the promisor to maintain the original size of her 
promise (a ride all the way to the airport) despite the costs of entering the legally binding form, 
this new outcome will be a Pareto improvement over the alternative—a reduction in the size of 
the promise (a ride only to the bus station).  The promisee should value being driven all the way 
to the airport more than the money given as a return payment, and the promisor should value the 
return payment above the costs of the additional driving. 
 Moreover, this example actually understates our argument.  When something other than 
money is used as a return payment, there is every reason to think promisees will offer something 
that the promisors value more than they do.  Rational promisees should offer whatever return 
payment they have available that maximizes the benefit conferred on promisors at the minimum 
cost to the promisee.  In the airport example, the promisee might offer to watch the promisor’s 
kids, to give the promisor guitar lessons, or to provide some other good or service that the 
promisee can offer at below-market costs.  Consequently, signaling through the use of return 
payments does not create the same harms as signaling through reductions in the size of a 
promise.   
 
146 See section I.B.1. for more on this point. 
147 Part II.C 
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 Signaling through scope adjustments also avoids the harms from reducing a promise’s 
size.  The conclusions in Part III relied on the assumption of asymmetric information.  Promisors 
only engage in inefficient signaling when they cannot directly communicate their probability of 
performance to promisees.  Under conditions of symmetric information, there are no incentives 
for inefficient signaling, and promisors should offer welfare-maximizing combinations of terms.  
Promisors only depart from the welfare-maximizing bundle of terms in order to signal their 
reliability. 
By making scope adjustments, promisors can directly communicate information about 
their probability of performance.  This communication is not perfect, and excessive use of scope 
adjustments can lead to inefficiencies.  But scope adjustments still avoid the harms associated 
with reducing a promise’s size.   
The reason promisors cannot directly communicate information about their reliability 
without scope adjustments is that unreliable promisors face incentives to mimic what is said by 
reliable promisors.  Scope adjustments specify conditions under which a promise will not be 
performed.  When reliable promisors make scope adjustments in order to compensate for 
increasing their level of sanctions, they explain circumstances that would cause them to renege 
on the promise.  Facing incentives to mimic the statements of reliable promisors, unreliable 
promisors may make similar scope adjustments.   
Still, unreliable promisors should not need to specify the same exact conditions for non-
performance as reliable promisors.  Multiple reliable promisors may differ in the exact 
circumstances under which they would be unable to perform.  Reliability is an aggregate 
characteristic.  Two promisors are equally reliable when the sum of their probabilities of non-
performance due to various conditions is the same; the exact composition of the individual non-
performance conditions need not be identical.  Unreliable promisors should thus only need to 
mimic reliable promisors with regard to their aggregate probability of non-performance.  They 
can specify non-performance conditions freely as long as they do not exceed the aggregate 
probability expressed by reliable promisors.  Since unreliable promisors may mimic the 
aggregate reliability conveyed by reliable promisors, scope adjustments cannot create symmetric 
information.  Promisors still cannot directly convey their probability of performance.  Yet the 
key point remains that scope adjustments communicate some information about non-
performance conditions.  
Promisees benefit from knowing the composition of promisors’ non-performance 
conditions even when they do not know whether the specified conditions are the only 
circumstances under which the promisor will not perform or the aggregate probability of 
performance.  Knowing some of the conditions under which a promisor might renege can help 
the promisee to take precautions against default.  The probability associated with each condition 
may not remain constant over time.  If a promise is to be fulfilled two years after it was formed, 
the promisee may wish to reevaluate the probability of performance at the end of year one.  To 
the extent the promisee knows some of the conditions under which non-performance is likely to 
occur, she can better estimate the new aggregate likelihood of breach.  If a promisor specifies a 
non-performance condition that she will not drive the promisor to the airport if there is ice on the 
road, the promisee can check the weather forecast the day before and thereby determine whether 
she needs to order a cab.  Reassessments of this sort made after the time of promising do not 
affect promisor welfare.  But the promisees can benefit from being able to better decide the 
degree to which the promise should be relied on.  Overall welfare increases to the extent 
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promisees can avoid relying too much or too little.  Specification of scope conditions helps 
promisees rely optimally.   
The overall effects of signaling-based scope adjustments depend on the reason the 
promisors failed to specify these scope conditions prior to signaling.  One possibility is that, with 
sanctions low, the promisors preferred not to reveal information that might cause the promisees 
to lower their assessments of the promisors’ reliability.  All else being equal, a promisee might 
assign a lower probability of performance to promisors specifying scope conditions than to 
promisors who do not specify these conditions.  After all, specifying a scope condition involves 
admitting at least one potential circumstance under which the promisor will not perform.  But 
once signaling forces these promisors to make their promise legally binding, the prospect of 
facing legal sanctions in the event of breach may overwhelm their concern about worsening the 
perception of their reliability in the eyes of the promisees. 
To the extent this forms the reason that promisors fail to specify scope conditions in the 
absence of signaling, signaling-based scope adjustments clearly increase welfare.  Specifying the 
scope conditions does not decrease the magnitude of what the promisor actually intends to 
deliver, but only involves the promisor conveying information about the circumstances under 
which she is likely to breach.  This conveyance of information to the promisees helps them rely 
optimally and thereby improves welfare. 
However, promisors might face costs in analyzing their non-performance conditions.  At 
some level, evaluating all of the circumstances under which the promisor would need to breach 
might not be cost effective.  Or signaling might cause promisors to specify scope conditions for 
circumstances where they might have actually performed in the absence of signaling concerns. 
Hence, the potential for scope adjustments might not completely alleviate the potential harms 
from signaling spirals.  But, at a minimum, scope adjustments should greatly minimize these 
harms.  And if signaling causes promisors to make value-enhancing scope specifications that 
they would otherwise have been unwilling to reveal, these scope adjustments might even make 
the signaling spirals efficient. Whereas size adjustments reduce the potential gains from trade, 
scope adjustments provide information that can improve promisee welfare. 
Together, the potential for return payments and scope adjustments should alleviate most 
of the harms from inefficient signaling, and may even cause this signaling to be efficient.  Where 
size adjustments reduce overall welfare, return payments and scope adjustments may enhance 
welfare.  At the very least, adjusting these terms should not create anywhere near as much harm 
as size reductions create.148 
Once we relax the assumption of only two terms, signaling spirals no longer present a 
significant cause for concern.  When return payments and scope adjustments are available, we 
can return to the standard assumption that parties benefit when the law enforces their mutually 
agreed upon statements made at the time of contract formation.  Promisors should only make 
promises when they benefit from doing so, and promisees should only accept the promises when 
they likewise benefit.  Promises made with multiple terms enhance social welfare by transferring 
 
148 Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that promisors face increasing marginal costs from making adjustments 
to any one term.  Even if return payments and scope adjustments were just as harmful as size adjustments, the ability 
to adjust these terms might still mitigate some of the harm from inefficient signaling.  To the extent adjusting terms 
produces increasing marginal costs, more welfare is lost from a second reduction to the size of a promise than from a 
first adjustment of equivalent magnitude, with even more welfare lost by a third adjustment.  If the promisors can 
split their adjustments across multiple terms, instead of adjusting only the size of the promise, less welfare may be 
lost even when equivalently sized adjustments to any one of the terms would be equally costly.   
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the promised goods or services to the parties who value them the most or who have the greatest 
need for them, while permitting promisees to rely adequately on the promisor’s ultimate 
performance. 
 
2.  The Availability of Multiple Terms 
Having satisfied ourselves that the potential for multiple terms alleviates the harm from 
signaling spirals, we need to determine the circumstances under which promises can be 
characterized by multiple terms.  Our answer is simple: Multiple terms will generally be 
available in the same contexts in which parties can invoke consideration.  When anti-
commodification norms prevent parties from articulating consideration, these norms will often 
obstruct return payments and scope adjustments as well.   
The reasons for this are readily apparent in the case of return payments.  Consideration is 
a form of return payment.  When a promisee offers consideration in exchange for a promise, she 
is by definition offering a return payment.  The consideration doctrine can only be activated 
when the parties claim that a promise is being given in exchange for a return 
payment/consideration.  When social norms permit parties to explicitly discuss return payments, 
they should also allow the parties to use return payments as a term of the promise.  The act of 
bargaining entails a discussion of the amount of consideration, which effectively makes the level 
of return payments a term of the promise.  
Nevertheless, we might imagine circumstances in which return payments are available 
but consideration is not.  In order to invoke the consideration doctrine, the parties must explicitly 
acknowledge the consideration/return payment.  If the parties were permitted to make return 
payments, but not to explicitly acknowledge these return payments, the consideration doctrine 
would still be unavailable. 
Yet using return payments as a term of a promise requires communication between the 
promisor and promisee.  The promisee must offer the return payments in exchange for the 
promisor maintaining the size of the promise.  It is hard to imagine communications of this sort 
taking place in contexts in which consideration is unavailable.  Where parties can negotiate 
explicitly, they should be able to discuss tradeoffs between return payments and the size of the 
promise.  Where the parties cannot negotiate explicitly—where consideration is unavailable—the 
parties will often find it impossible to negotiate over the level of return payments as a term of the 
promise. 
A similar logic applies to scope adjustments.  The reason consideration is often 
unavailable is that cost-benefit language can commodify a promise.  As Jane Baron writes, 
“economic transfers call for detached, analytic deliberation in quantitative, cost-benefit terms 
which are inappropriate to the emotional and moral realm of gifts.”149 Expressing a long list of 
conditions under which a promise will not be performed is the epitome of cost-benefit language. 
Consider our previous discussion of the economic logic behind trust-building 
promises.150 In some relationships, courts are unable to effectively monitor whether the parties 
cooperate in the manner required by the relationship.  In place of legal sanctions, the parties rely 
on mutual trust.  The use of consideration and cost-benefit language in trust-building promises 
violates the spirit of the relationship.  Promisors are expected to fulfill promises to the best of 
 
149 Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155, 196 (1989). 
150 See supra Part II.C. 
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their ability, and promisees are expected to understand if circumstances arise that make the 
promisor unable to perform.151 Perhaps promisors can permissibly inform promisees if there are 
particularly noteworthy circumstances under which performance would be impossible.  But 
attempts to negotiate tradeoffs between scope conditions and the size of the promise, or 
indications that the promisor is trading off between these terms, suggest a cost-benefit mentality 
inappropriate for trust-building purposes. 
Looking back to our discussion of anti-commodification norms in philosophy and 
political theory, the explicit specification of duties within intimate relationships was thought to 
corrupt the meaning of those relationships.152 Evaluating in advance whether performance is 
cost effective under myriad circumstances implies that a relationship is valued as a means rather 
than as an end.  Specifying scope conditions signals that the value of the relationship is finite and 
definable, that the costs of maintaining the relationship can be traded off against other potential 
uses for the resources invested in the relationship.  In circumstances where anti-commodification 
norms block the use of consideration, the norms are likely to prevent the use of scope 
adjustments as well. 
As anthropologists and sociologists have explained, even thinking about non-
commodifiable relationships in cost-benefit terms can seem inappropriate.153 Yet specifying 
scope conditions requires the promisor to evaluate the predicted costs of performance under 
various circumstances and to weigh these costs against the benefit to be obtained from making 
the promise—or from making the promise a certain size.  When norms block the use of cost-
benefit thinking and language, parties will often lack the capacity to engage in this sort of 
reasoning. 
We do not mean to overstate our case.  We do not claim that there is a perfect 
relationship between social contexts in which consideration is unavailable and contexts in which 
norms prevent return payments and scope adjustments.  Social norms are intricately complex and 
circumstance dependent.  Any attempt to describe the content of norms at a general level is likely 
to be oversimplified.  Yet we have reason to expect a substantial overlap between the 
circumstances in which consideration is unavailable and the circumstances in which parties 
cannot make return payments or scope adjustments.  Consideration is a form of return payment; 
scope adjustments can only be made using a cost-benefit mentality that anti-commodification 
norms are designed to block.  When parties are able to articulate consideration, there is every 
reason to believe they will also be able to negotiate return payments and scope adjustments.  
When social norms block parties from voicing consideration, these norms will typically prevent 
return payments and scope adjustments as well.   
As such, any harms caused by signaling spirals will tend to be minimal under 
circumstances where consideration is socially available.  The consideration doctrine divides 
promisor-promisee relationships into a first category in which voicing consideration is possible 
and the parties are likely to be able to make return payments and scope adjustments, and a 
second category in which social norms prevent the articulation of consideration and likely 
obstruct the use of return payments and scope adjustments as well.  A legally binding option is 
 
151 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 58 AM. SOC. REV. 55 
(1963). 
152 See supra Part II.B. 
153 See supra Part II.A. 
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only granted for the first category, the category of circumstances in which inefficient signaling 
spirals are unlikely to occur.   
 
B. Circumstances in which Consideration Is Unavailable 
 
When contracting parties are able to voice consideration, they should typically be able to 
make scope adjustments and return payments, thus alleviating the potential harm from signaling 
spirals.  But what about promises for which norms block the use of consideration—promises for 
which inefficient signaling can pose a significant cause for concern? 
 The models described in Part III show that allowing a legally binding option for these 
promises can harm both promisors and promisees.  But the models do not show whether, on 
balance, allowing legal enforcement actually does harm the promisors and promisees.  The 
models conclude only that the welfare effects of a legally binding option are uncertain, that we 
cannot simply assume that parties desire the existence of this option based on their exercising the 
option.    
Whether an option for legal enforcement of promises enhances or diminishes welfare 
depends on a variety of factors, including: the promisors’ probabilities of performance, the 
potential benefits from increasing promisee reliance, and the magnitude of the costs promisors 
bear when faced with legal sanctions.  We might question whether enforcing promises would 
either be generally welfare enhancing or welfare diminishing within the likely specifications for 
these factors.  But how can we know what specifications are reasonable?   
Aghion and Hermalin conclude that “the question of whether a given set of restrictions 
improves or reduces efficiency is an empirical one: only by considering variations in these 
restrictions over time, across states, or across nations can one truly determine the effects of these 
restrictions on efficiency.”154 Empirical analysis might shed some light on our question.  
Perhaps empirical studies could show that the effects of inefficient signaling are muted for 
certain types of promises, or conversely, that the likely harms from inefficient signaling are 
particularly severe for select groups of promises.  But we doubt that empirical studies are capable 
of determining the effects of making a legally binding option available for the entire range of 
non-commodifiable promises. 
Signaling spirals only occur among groups of promisors with similar observable 
characteristics.  When a legally binding option is offered to a group of promisors, this should not 
affect promisors with different observable characteristics—promisors who are not part of the 
same reference group.  For example, if Gina promises to give Fred a car at a future date, Fred 
will probably try to assess Gina’s probability of performance by looking to whether promisors 
similar to Gina fulfilled promises of a similar nature in the past.  If Gina is an elderly social 
worker, and Barbara is a young shopkeeper, Fred probably will not assess the likelihood of Gina 
actually delivering the car by examining whether Barbara previously fulfilled a promise to sell 
bubblegum for a dollar.  Both the promisors and the promises are sufficiently dissimilar in these 
two scenarios that they are unlikely to be part of the same reference group.155 
154 Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 404. 
155 As an aside, we do not actually believe that promisees assess promisors’ reliability in such a formulaic fashion.  
Nevertheless, we do believe that people form expectations about the likely behavior of others through experience 
and through stories of others’ experiences.  Fred may not actually search his mind for whether promisors similar to 
Gina performed in the past when determining his expectations about whether Gina will perform.  But Fred’s 
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As such, a necessary first step to performing any empirical analysis requires determining 
which promises are in the same reference group.  This assessment is by no means trivial.  
Individual promisors may fall within multiple reference groups for different types of promises, 
creating an interlocking web of reference groups.  And promisees may differ about what 
observable characteristics they find most salient.  For instance, a racist promisee might not 
consider promises made by the members of a minority group as comparable to promises made by 
the majority, while a non-racist promisee would lump promisors into reference groups without 
looking at the color of their skin.  Any promisor can be viewed as having an infinite number of 
observable characteristics, yet promisees will only take some of these characteristics into account 
when making judgments about which promisors are comparable.156 A meaningful empirical 
analysis would have to sort through this convoluted and constantly-shifting web of reference 
groups in order to evaluate the magnitude of signaling costs. 
In the absence of convincing empirical studies, we need a default determination about 
whether to provide a legally binding option for non-commodifiable promises.  We must look 
beyond the models in order to decide which default determination is more appropriate—either 
denying enforcement to promises unbacked by consideration or allowing all promises to be 
enforced.    
 
C.  Tie-Breaking Factors 
The standard assumption that the law should enforce parties’ expressed intentions relies 
on the notion that these expressed intentions represent the parties’ underlying desires.  But for 
non-commodifiable promises, signaling spirals can lead promisors to enter a legally binding 
form even when they would prefer that the form not exist.  Lacking means for determining 
parties’ true desires, we look to a number of tie-breaking factors that support a default rule of 
non-enforcement.  None of these factors are particularly persuasive, at least to the extent we have 
developed them here; we do not claim any of the factors would justify ignoring parties’ wishes if 
we could confidently ascertain those wishes.  But in the absence of a better guide for policy, 
these factors support a default rule of denying enforcement to promises unbacked by 
consideration.   
For our first tie-breaking factor, we cite the administrative costs of enforcement.  
Enforcing promises through the legal system creates numerous costs.  Someone must pay for the 
judge’s salary and the salaries of the other court employees.  And lawyers typically take a 
significant portion of the eventual judgment or settlement.  Even the time the parties invest in 
litigating a dispute can represent significant costs.  These costs warn against legal overreaching.  
 
expectation about Gina’s likelihood of performance must arise from somewhere.  If Fred has witnessed promisors 
similar to Gina reneging on their promises in the past, he is more likely to doubt Gina’s probability of performance.  
Signaling spirals do not take place immediately.  But over time, removing some of the members from a reference 
group is likely to alter promisees’ expectations about the remaining members of the group. 
156 We continue to assume that promisors have limited control over their observable characteristics.  Or, at a 
minimum, that any efforts by promisors to adjust their observable characteristics for signaling purposes when 
consideration is not available do not create significant welfare costs.  To the extent promisors invest in being viewed 
as responsible, these efforts might be welfare enhancing.  The set of behaviors likely to signal that one is a reliable 
promisor are generally viewed as socially desirable – avoiding lying, displaying generosity, and so on. See note 139 
supra for a related discussion.
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When we are truly uncertain about whether the law could effectively monitor a social dispute, 
administrative costs form a tie-breaker justifying legal restraint.157 
As a second tie-breaking factor, we note that non-commodifiable promises operate within 
a web of complex obligations.  The fact that parties cannot voice consideration for these 
promises suggests that there may be other mutually understood obligations that are never 
explicitly stated in a form that courts can identify.158 To enforce only the explicitly promised 
obligations would risk imposing an undue burden on the promisor, as her explicitly articulated 
obligations would become enforceable but any unarticulated return obligations of the promisee 
would remained unenforced. 
 Third, even ignoring the potential harm from inefficient signaling, the welfare 
consequences of non-commodifiable promises may be ambiguous.  Eric Posner has discussed at 
length why status-enhancing and trust-building promises are not necessarily welfare 
enhancing.159 The reason is that these promises are positional in nature.  When one promisor 
gains status, others lose status.  And when promisors use gifts to gain a promisee’s trust, these 
gifts can raise the costs to everyone else of gaining trust.  The use of promises to gain trust or 
status can result in a prisoners’ dilemma problem.  Promisors may find themselves giving gifts 
merely to retain their relative position, such that they would be better off if everyone abstained 
from making status-enhancing and trust-building promises.160 
Almost by definition, the message sent by non-commodifiable promises is more 
important than the actual transfer of goods or services.  We assume that the transfer of goods or 
services from altruistic and exchange-oriented promises enhances welfare because otherwise 
these promises would not be made.  Promisors make exchange-oriented promises in order to gain 
something of value from the promisees—something that they prefer more than the goods or 
services they give up.  And promisors make altruistic promises because they want the promisees 
to have the promised goods or services.  But we have no reason for assuming that the actual 
transfer of goods or services enhances welfare in non-commodifiable promises.  Consequently, it 
is hard to generalize about whether these transfers enhance or diminish welfare.  When the 
 
157 Moreover, administrative costs may be particularly high for non-commodifiable promises.  These promises were 
originally made within thick social relationships where the promisors were more concerned with the message sent 
by the promise than by the actual transaction.  Promisees will typically only sue over breaches of these promises 
when the relationship between the parties has soured beyond repair.  Non-commodifiable relationships are thick and 
infused with meaning.  When these relationships go bad and lead to litigation, the parties may pursue the litigation 
without regard to its costs or economic rationality.  Winning the dispute may become more important to the parties 
than the actual recovery; the parties may be willing to invest more in the lawsuits than the amount of the recovery 
can justify.  As such, the case for a default rule against legal enforcement based on administrative costs gains 
additional strength for non-commodifiable promises.  See Marc S. Galanter, “Reading The Landscape Of Disputes: 
What We Know And Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious And Litigious 
Society,” 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 24-25 (1983).   
158 This observation has spawned the field of transaction cost economics.  See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, 
Transaction Cost Economics and Organizational Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 77 (Smelser 
& Swedberg eds., 1994). 
159 Posner, supra note 125. 
160 Refusing to enforce these promises would not prevent parties from making trust-building or status-enhancing 
gifts.  But without enforceable promises, parties would at least be prevented from making gifts larger than they can 
currently afford. 
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potential costs from signaling spirals are factored in, we might presume that enforcing these 
promises would generally reduce welfare.161 
On a related note, our fourth tie-breaking factor looks back to our discussion of 
Philosophy and Political Theory.162 Many of the arguments supporting anti-commodification 
norms contain value judgments.  The norms against commodification were thought to perform 
important functions such as preventing the wealthy from purchasing power within non-market 
spheres, protecting goods and relationships with inherent dignity from being corrupted by market 
language and logic, and insuring that these goods and relationships are treated with the respect 
they deserve.  When it is normatively inappropriate for the parties to discuss a promise using 
cost-benefit language, do we really want a judge or jury to assign damages for breech?  
Calculating damages requires cost-benefit thinking; the promise must generally be assigned a 
dollar value.163 This is the essence of commodification.  Anti-commodification norms might 
warn against legal enforcement just as they prevent the parties from explicit bargaining. 
 Finally, we note that parties can always transgress anti-commodification norms and 
invoke the consideration doctrine if they place sufficient value on having their promises 
enforced.  Even parties operating within thick relationships sometimes hire lawyers.  We do not 
claim any certainty about the nature or scope of anti-commodification norms.  In many contexts, 
promises may be characterized by mixed motives.  The parties may care about both the substance 
of the transaction and the message sent by the transaction.  By requiring only nominal 
consideration, our preferred version of the consideration doctrine would provide a legally 
binding option for all parties who sufficiently care about the substance of their transaction to 
ignore any norms against voicing consideration.  When the parties already trust one another, for 
instance, they may find it easy to invoke consideration.  But when the parties are engaged in a 
delicate courtship dance with high potential for misunderstandings, they may decide that the 
potential gains from making a promise binding do not justify the risk of violating anti-
commodification norms.   
In a sense, we force the parties to trade off between concerns over inappropriate signaling 
and the inability to secure their promises through law, rather than requiring courts to make these 
judgments.  If the parties place sufficient value on making a promise enforceable, they can 
always declare that the promise is being exchanged for a penny, even if doing so is socially 
awkward or risks sending an undesired message.  As such, when anti-commodification norms 
deter parties from invoking even nominal consideration, we can expect that the parties were not 
overly concerned about being unable to secure their promise through law.  
Our tie-breaking factors are speculative and under-theorized.  We cannot fully develop 
these arguments within the space constraints of this article.  Nevertheless, we believe the factors 
combine to justify a default rule against enforcing non-commodifiable promises.  When 
 
161 We express deep discomfort about these speculations into promises’ social worth.  Again, we only resort to these 
substantivist arguments as a tie-breaker; we would instead look to the parties’ desires if we could confidently 
ascertain their desires.  However, it is worth noting that our substantivist tie-breaker argument draws a different line 
than the substantivist arguments we discussed in Part I.B.  We continue to believe that gratuitous promises as a class 
are no less valuable than exchange promises.  Altruistic promises should generally be welfare enhancing.  We 
suggest only that non-commodifiable gratuitous promises – promises made for signaling purposes such as trust or 
status – might lack socially value. 
162 Part II.B. 
163 We might avoid calculating damages by only providing the remedy of specific performance.  But this would 
require a significant adjustment to our law of contract remedies. 
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signaling spirals make it impossible to determine the parties’ true desires, the tie-breaking 
arguments provide cause for denying the option to have promises enforced.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Substantive theorists have sought to deny legal support for gratuitous promises; formalist 
scholars have been unable to justify the use of consideration in place of alternative forms.  Our 
account takes a different approach, arguing that requiring nominal consideration leads to 
enforcing promises when parties actually wish to be bound.  We base our account on the roles of 
anti-commodification norms and of inefficient signaling.  What previous scholars have failed to 
realize is that even nominal consideration is unavailable within certain social contexts.  When 
parties are unable to articulate consideration, they will generally also be unable to make return 
payments and scope adjustments, creating the potential for inefficient signaling spirals that can 
harm both promisors and promisees.   
 The consideration form can thus serve to identify contexts in which parties are fully able 
to bargain over the content of their promises.  What ultimately matters is not whether the parties 
do offer consideration, but rather whether they can offer consideration.  The key question is 
whether social norms permit bargaining over the terms of a promise.  As such, the use of 
consideration language informs courts that providing a legally binding option will benefit the 
contracting parties.  By voicing consideration, the parties demonstrate that their expressed 
intentions correspond with their underlying desires—that their promise is of a type for which 
parties should generally desire an option for legal enforcement. 
 Our account provides a framework for clearing up the morass of existing doctrine.  Many 
of the conflicting precedents that currently plague the case law have arisen from courts’ attempts 
to determine which promises are socially valuable.164 These inquiries are misguided.  When the 
consideration doctrine is interpreted to allow nominal consideration, parties can make this 
determination instead of the courts.  Whenever the parties care sufficiently about having their 
promises supported by law—valuing the substance of their transaction over any messages it 
might send—the parties can invoke consideration.  A nominal consideration requirement only 
denies enforcement when promises are made within ritualized social contexts in which norms 
block the use of even nominal consideration—contexts in which inefficient signaling combines 
with tie-breaking factors so that parties would generally prefer to leave their promises non-
binding. 
 The consideration doctrine is not the only mechanism used for making promises legally 
binding.  In addition to consideration, courts sometimes consider other doctrines like reliance.  
Our paper seeks only to justify the consideration doctrine, not to provide a complete account of 
all potential rules for contract formation.  Indeed, our account provides strong support for 
enforcing promises backed by nominal consideration, but it does not necessarily mean that 
promises lacking consideration should not be enforced.  The law might well benefit from using 
other doctrines like reliance to supplement the consideration doctrine, providing additional 
methods by which promises might be enforced. 
 Although our account does not completely address potential supplements to the 
consideration doctrine, our discussion provides a framework through which these supplementary 
approaches should be analyzed.  For instance, some states enforce promises using a seal doctrine 
 
164 See supra Part I.C. 
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even when consideration is lacking.  By signing written statements of their promises in the 
presence of a notary public, promisors in these states can make even unilateral promises legally 
binding.  To determine the merits of this supplemental rule, future papers must look to both 
inefficient signaling and to anti-commodification norms.  We have assumed for the purposes of 
our argument that alternatives to nominal consideration like a seal or writing requirement are 
less-sensitive to anti-commodification norms, but this might not be the case.  Certainly, anti-
commodification norms block more than just the use of bargaining.  There might be 
circumstances in which bargaining is socially appropriate, but where going to a notary public 
would violate taboos.     
 We have argued that a nominal consideration requirement effectively divides the 
circumstances in which inefficient signaling presents a serious problem from circumstances in 
which this problem does not occur.  We believe that nominal consideration performs this role far 
better than any alternative forms.  Although nominal consideration is not the only formalism 
entangled with anti-commodification norms, no other formalism equally signifies whether parties 
are able to negotiate over more than two terms.  After all, the existence of consideration 
(otherwise known as return payments) is one of the additional terms we analyze in Part IV.  And 
the other term—scope adjustments—will be permissible within the same general set of social 
scenarios as nominal consideration.  Although we are open to the use of alternative doctrines as a 
supplement to our nominal consideration rule, we remain confident that nominal consideration 
should be the primary mechanism through which promises are made legally binding.   
 We believe that anti-commodification norms have significant implications for contract 
formation.  We hope to see further work analyzing the implications of these norms.  As a tie-
breaking argument, we note that it may be undesirable for courts to entangle themselves with 
non-commodifiable promises.  Yet this argument might stand on its own, justifying the 
consideration doctrine even apart from our game theory and welfare analysis.165 How courts 
should react to anti-commodification norms is an under-theorized question that merits further 
inquiry.  And future empirical studies might demonstrate that certain sets of promises are not 
subject to inefficient signaling spirals and should thus be enforceable even without nominal 
consideration.166 
This paper has been dedicated to proving a single point: that courts should enforce 
promises backed only by nominal consideration.  Despite the many questions our account leaves 
unanswered, on this point we are certain.  Courts should not create special rules to deny legal 
support for inter-familial promises and the like.  To the extent that the relationship-oriented 
 
165 To fully develop this argument would require a much deeper engagement with the commodification literature 
than we offer here.  Where we avoid taking sides in the commodification debate and limit ourselves to drawing 
general conclusions from the literature, developing an argument of this sort would require evaluating conflicting 
theories about the nature of the anti-commodification phenomenon and its normative implications. 
166 Yet, even here, our account would provide a framework for analyzing whether exceptions of this sort are valid.  It 
is not enough to claim that exempted promises are socially valuable, as these inquiries have been made in the past.  
This argument only had force against the assumption that other gratuitous promises were valueless, an assumption 
we have shown to be mistaken.  Even if we prioritize encouraging certain promises – for example: donations to 
charities – above any potential harm to promisors, this would not necessarily justify excepting these promises from 
the consideration requirement.  Inefficient signaling spirals can harm promisees—such as charitable recipients—in 
addition to harming promisors.  Only if future empirical studies show that inefficient signaling is unlikely for certain 
categories of non-commodifiable promises should we exclude these promises from the consideration requirement.  
Until studies of this sort can be conducted, we favor a default rule of only enforcing promises backed by at least 
nominal consideration.  And we continue to doubt whether it would even be possible to conduct studies of this sort. 
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nature of these promises presents a problem, anti-commodification norms will deny these parties 
the use of nominal consideration without the need for courts to intervene.  In place of the various 
substantive inquiries made by existing case law, we call for making the existence of nominal 
consideration both a necessary and sufficient condition for the use of the consideration doctrine.  
Our account provides courts with simpler and more coherent guidelines for applying the 
consideration doctrine, and with a superior method for determining which promises parties 
actually desire to have enforced.  
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APPENDIX A.  THE AGHION-HERMALIN MODEL OF INEFFICIENT SIGNALING 
This Appendix begins our formal proof for the problem of inefficient signaling, as 
discussed in Part III of the paper.  Our proof relies on a model developed by Phillippe Aghion 
and Benjamin Hermalin.167 Their model shows how limitations on contractual terms can be 
welfare enhancing.168 The Aghion-Hermalin model is part of a newer form of game theory based 
on asymmetric information.169 This branch of scholarship first developed as part of insurance 
economics, but the approach has since been applied to numerous problems in law and 
economics.170 Nevertheless, this article is the first time a model of this sort has been used to 
analyze the consideration doctrine.171 This Appendix proceeds in two sections: Section A shows 
how our question – whether limitations should be placed on promisors’ ability to legally bind 
themselves – fits the conditions under which the Aghion-Hermalin model applies.  Section B 
explains the model’s implications through a series of graphs.   
 
A.  Six Conditions under Which the Model Applies 
Space constraints prevent us from formally elaborating the Aghion-Hermalin model.172 
Fortunately, the authors prove that their results hold whenever six conditions apply.173 The 
conditions are as follows: First, there must be “opposite preferences over the contract terms.”174 
167 Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 1344, at 381-98. 
168 The authors’ paradigmatic case involves an entrepreneur raising capital for a project.  Aghion & Hermalin, id., at 
381-98.  Their paper shows the possibility of efficiency gains from limitations on the amount the entrepreneur can 
be forced to pay in the case of default, essentially justifying bankruptcy laws.  Id. at 400-01.  The authors also 
discuss how their model can be applied to limitations on penalties for breach of contract and to mandated benefits in 
employment contracts.  In a separate paper, Ian Ayres has used their model to discuss possible inefficiencies in 
corporate contracting.  Ian Ayres, The Possibility of Inefficient Corporate Contracts, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 387 (1991).  
We draw upon Ayres’s work in seeking to present a simplified description of the Aghion-Hermalin model. 
169 Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 387-92.  Aghion and Hermalin base their work on an extensive body of 
scholarship.  In addition to the Rothschild and Stiglitz piece previously mentioned, supra note 84, noteworthy works 
include George Akerlof, The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QUART. J. 
OF ECON. 488 (1970) and A. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 QUART. J. OF ECON 629 (1973).  In 2001, 
Akerlof, Spence, and Stiglitz jointly won the Nobel Prize for their work on asymmetric information and signaling.  
Although our analysis relies on papers by these authors and others, we do not discuss all of our debts.  Suffice it to 
say that both Aghion and Hermalin’s model and our own extension of that model stand on a mountain of previous 
economics scholarship. 
170 Ian Ayres describes some of the ways in which this scholarship has been applied to legal problems in Ian Ayres, 
Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1291 (1990).   
171 It is mysterious as to why scholars have failed to realize the implications of this scholarship for the consideration 
doctrine as at least some scholars interested in applying economic reasoning to contract law are familiar with the 
form of analysis.  For instance, Eric Posner discusses the Aghion-Hermalin model in his recent essay Economic 
Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L. J. 829, 860 (2003).  Nevertheless, 
in the very same article, Posner repeats the conventional wisdom that contract law should decide which contracts to 
enforce by looking at promisor’s intentions, Id. at 849.  He concludes his discussion of the consideration doctrine by 
supporting our premise that existing scholarship has failed to justify the doctrine’s refusal to enforce promises where 
promisors clearly intended the contract to be enforced. Id. at 850-51.  He never mentions the possibility of applying 
an Aghion-Hermalin type model to address this puzzle. 
172 The model fills twenty-nine pages of an economics journal and relies on a level of mathematical complexity 
beyond the ability of most readers of law journals to comprehend. 
173 Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 384, 398. 
174 Id. at 398.
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Second, both promisors and promisees must have “convex preferences over the terms of the 
contract.”175 Third, the different types of promisors must systematically differ with regard to the 
“marginal rate of substitution between the terms of the contract.”176 Fourth, promisors must have 
“private information” that “cannot be contracted on.”177 Fifth, promisors must have “bargaining 
power.”178 And sixth, the terms of the contract must lie on a continuous spectrum.179 
The first five conditions clearly apply to our question—whether limiting the availability 
of a legally binding form can enhance welfare.  Only the sixth condition is questionable. 
The first condition is easily met; promisors and promisees have opposite preferences for 
both contracting terms.  Holding the benefit the promisor expects to obtain from promising 
constant, promisors prefer to obtain this benefit using the lowest possible values for both the size 
of the promise and the level of sanctions, while promisees prefer higher values for these terms.180 
As such, promisors have cost and value curves that work in opposite directions.  The higher 
promisors set the terms the more the promisees benefit, and the more the promisors can receive 
in return for making the promise.181 Yet raising the terms increases the costs of making the 
promise.  Promisors should thus choose the combination of terms that generates the maximum 
value at the minimum cost. 
Moving to the second condition, the parties should have convex preferences over the 
terms of the contract.  Convex preferences come from risk aversion.  Risk aversion is a standard 
assumption in economic models and is thought to originate from the decreasing marginal utility 
of money.182 Like most economic actors, promisors and promisees should generally be risk 
averse. 
The third condition requires that promisors differ in their willingness to trade off between 
the two terms.  This condition holds because promisors have varying probabilities of 
performance.  For any fixed level of benefit, reliable promisors should be more willing to 
 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 Id at 384. Aghion & Hermalin assume that their contract terms are continuous following standard economic 
practice.  As such, they do not discuss this assumption when generalizing their results.  Also following standard 
economic practice, they assume their terms can be represented by twice-differentiable von Neumann-Morgernstern 
utility functions. Id.   
180 Promisees prefer higher levels of sanctions first because sanctions make it costly for the promisor to renege and 
thus increase the probability of performance and second because—in the case of legal damages—some portion of 
the sanctions are paid by the promisor to the promisee. 
181 To see why this is the case, we must return to the four types of promises described in Part II.C of the paper.  For 
all four types of promises, the value the promisors receive from making the promise depends on the benefit 
conferred on promisees.  In the case of exchange-oriented and trust-building promises, the more promisors offer, the 
more promisees should be willing to give in return—whether in the form of a defined exchange or undefined 
goodwill.  Similarly, large status-enhancing promises generate more status than do small status-enhancing promises.  
And altruistic promisors benefit directly from the value conferred on promisees due to interdependent utility.  Thus, 
regardless of a promisor’s motivation, the benefit a promisor receives from making a promise partially depends on 
the size of the promise – the benefit conferred on the promisee. 
182 But see MATTHEW RABIN, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion, in CHOICES,
VALUES, AND FRAMES (Kahneman & Tversky eds., 2000) (arguing that diminishing marginal utility of wealth 
cannot explain the levels of risk aversion frequently observed).  Instead, Rabin claims risk aversion is a result of 
cognitive biases related to the endowment effect. 
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increase their level of sanctions while reducing the size of their promise than are unreliable 
promisors.   
The fourth and fifth conditions require that promisors have private information and can 
exercise market power.  These conditions follow from our assumption of asymmetric 
information and our use of the offer-acceptance model, respectively.183 
Finally, we assume that the sixth condition holds for the purposes of this Appendix.  The 
sixth condition demands that both contracting terms fall along a continuous spectrum.  In other 
words, promisors must be able to gradually increase or decrease both the size of their promises 
and the level of sanctions rather than being forced to choose between discrete options.   
The size of a promise probably does fall along a continuous spectrum in most cases.  A 
promisor might increase the magnitude of a promise by pledging to transfer a larger quantity of 
goods or services.  When the quantity cannot be altered, a promisor might still increase the size 
of the promise by delivering the goods or services at an earlier point in time or otherwise making 
the promise more desirable to the promisee.  
In contrast, we have doubts about whether the level of sanctions falls along a continuous 
spectrum.  In many cases, promisors may be stuck with the discrete choice between offering 
either a set level of sanctions corresponding with social stigma or else a set level of sanctions 
resulting from legal damages.  Nevertheless, we assume that the level of sanctions falls on a 
continuous spectrum for the purposes of this Appendix.184 For balance, we adopt the opposite 
assumption when creating our own model in Appendix B. 
Although we assume that the level of sanctions falls on a continuous spectrum, there is 
still a limit to the maximum level of sanctions.  This limit can either be set by the promisor’s 
wealth—promisors cannot pay more in damages than they own—or else by law.  Where the 
consideration doctrine prevents parties from making their promises binding, such as for many 
gratuitous promises, the maximum level of sanctions corresponds with the highest possible 
amount of social stigma.  Where the consideration doctrine allows parties to secure their 
promises through law, such as for most exchanges and for when courts enforce gratuitous 
promises backed by only nominal consideration, the maximum level of sanctions corresponds 
with the highest possible amount of legal damages.  The level of sanctions is still continuous, as 
a promisor can set the sanctions at any level up to the maximum limit.  But there exists a 
maximum level of sanctions which can be altered by changing the law.185 
Consequently, all six assumptions can be said to hold for the question of whether 
allowing a legally binding option might reduce welfare.  As such, the Aghion-Hermalin model 
can be used to analyze the consideration doctrine.  
 
183 There are circumstances under which a promisee can have market power rather than the promisor—such as if the 
promisor is a supplier to a monopsonist buyer.  But as a general rule, promisors should have market power as long as 
they design their promises as in the offer-acceptance model. 
184 This assumption is not entirely implausible.  The potential for stigma might be increased by pledging publicly or 
by invoking a religious or culturally significant symbol to secure the promise.  For instance, swearing to God or on a 
Bible might have more serious social consequences than a promise unbacked by any religious symbolism  And 
where the law permits the use of liquidated damages clauses, parties can set the amount of legal sanctions at any 
level they like.  Still, there are natural limits to the level of stigma related damages and liquidated damages clauses 
are often unavailable due to either legal or practical limitations.  See infra note 195, for further discussion.    
185 Allowing an option for legal enforcement increases the maximum level of sanctions above stigma levels.  For 
enforceable promises, allowing liquidated damages clauses can increase the maximum level of sanctions.  Striking 
down unreasonably high liquidated damages clauses limits the maximum level of legal sanctions. 
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B.  Explaining the Model’s Implications 
Since all six conditions can be said to apply, Aghion and Hermalin’s conclusions hold for 
our question.  Limiting the availability of a legally binding form can increase welfare; the mere 
fact that parties choose to employ a legally binding option does not indicate that they benefit 
from the existence of that option.  The logic behind this conclusion is best demonstrated through 
a series of graphs.  Readers desiring more formal substantiation of these results should refer to 
Aghion and Hermalin’s article.186 
Figure 2 shows how promisors value the tradeoffs between the costs associated with the 
size of a promise and the level of sanctions.  CR depicts the cost tradeoff curve of a reliable 
promisor.  CU shows the cost tradeoff curve of a promisor with a lower probability of 
performance—an “unreliable” promisor.  As the reliable promisor knows that she is less likely to 
default, she will be more willing to accept a high level of sanctions than will the unreliable 
promisor.  Locations on the southwest portion of the graph correspond with lower costs for 
promisors than do locations to the northeast. 
Figure 3 shows the combinations of the two terms capable of producing the same level of 
value for the promisors, in other words, the promisors’ indifference curves or value curves.  
Since the value received by promisors is related to the benefit conferred on promisees, and since 
promisees prefer larger-sized promises and higher levels of sanctions, the level of value increases 
toward the northeast corner of the graph.  
 The value a promisor receives from making a promise also depends on her perceived 
reliability.  Value curve VR depicts the mix of terms a promisor can offer in exchange for a 
specified level of value if she is viewed as a reliable type.  Value curve VU shows the mix of 
terms required to produce the same level of value if the promisor is perceived as an unreliable 
type.  Promisors perceived as unreliable need to offer a higher mixture of the two terms in order 
to derive the same value as promisors perceived as reliable types; hence, curve VU lies to the 
northeast of curve VR.187 Whether a promisor needs to offer the terms described by VR or VU
186 Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134. 
187 Promisors perceived as unreliable also need to include a relatively higher level of sanctions in order to make their 
promises seem credible.  As such, the value curve of the unreliable type promisor is more steeply sloped than the 
value curve of the reliable type promisor. 
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depends on the promisor’s perceived reliability, not her actual reliability.188 VP shows the pooled 
value curve—the set of combinations of the two terms capable of producing the given level of 
value when it is impossible to tell whether the promisor is a reliable or unreliable type.189 
Figure 4 combines the cost and value curves to show a possible equilibrium for the terms 
chosen by the two promisors.  Point A represents the spot along the pooled value curve where the 
reliable-type promisor can derive the specified level of value with the minimal cost.  Without any 
ability to distinguish herself from unreliable promisors, a reliable promisor would select point A.  
Since unreliable promisors wish to be seen as reliable, they would also pick point A in order to 
avoid signaling their greater probability of default. 
However, reliable promisors face incentives to signal their greater reliability through their 
choice of terms.  For instance, reliable promisors might try to offer point C in order to 
differentiate their promises from those of the unreliable promisors.  If a reliable promisor could 
successfully communicate her type, offering point C would allow her to achieve the same value 
previously gained by point A, but at a lower cost.  In contrast, since the unreliable promisors 
have a steeper cost curve, offering point C would raise their costs as compared to point A.  Thus, 
we might think that that choosing point C would demonstrate that a promisor is of the reliable 
type. 
Yet, once the reliable promisors offer point C, unreliable promisors will no longer have 
the option of promising point A.  Choosing anything other than point C would reveal that a 
promisor is unreliable.  Instead, unreliable promisors must either follow the reliable promisors in 
offering point C or else offer point B—the minimum cost for achieving the specified level of 
value along the unreliable promisor value curve.  Point B corresponds to the cost curve CU*.
Since point C lies to the southwest of CU*, the unreliable promisors will follow the reliable ones 
in offering point C. 
Once the unreliable promisors begin offering point C, the reliable promisors can no 
longer achieve the specified level of value by picking a point on the curve VR. Instead, they 
must select a point along the pooled value curve VP. Moreover, the reliable promisors no longer 
have point A available as an option.  Any promisor who picks point A—regardless of their actual 
reliability—will be perceived as unreliable and will thus be unable to achieve the level of value 
associated with the pooled value line VP. The only options available are locations to the right of 
point C along the pooled value line VP, or else points along the unreliable promisor value line 
VU. The reliable promisors thus face incentives to continue increasing their level of sanctions in 
order to signal their difference from the unreliable promisors.  The unreliable promisors will 
continue following the reliable ones by also raising the level of sanctions they offer.  This 
process continues until both types of promisors reach the maximum level of sanctions.  
Consequently, both types of promisors end up offering point D, where the maximum level of 
sanctions intersects the pooled value curve VP.
The pooled equilibrium at point D is not an efficient outcome.  Both reliable and 
unreliable promisors would face lower costs and achieve the same benefit by offering promises 
at point A.  Assuming the value curves correspond with the benefit derived by promisees, the 
 
188 Again, the amount promisees offer in exchange for a promise depends on the promisor’s perceived reliability, not 
actual reliability. 
189 The slope of the pooled indifference curve must lie somewhere between the slope of the indifference curves for 
the reliable and unreliable type promisors.  The exact placement of the pooled curve depends on the relative 
numbers of reliable and unreliable type promisors in the overall population. 
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promisees should be indifferent between receiving promises at point A or point D.  As such, 
moving to point A would represent a Pareto improvement over the pooled equilibrium at point D.  
Both types of promisors would be better off if the promises were made at point A, while the 
promisees would not be harmed. 
 
A pooled equilibrium is not the only possible outcome for the signaling game.  Figure 5 
shows how the game can generate a separating equilibrium.  The slopes of the cost curves have 
been adjusted from those in Figure 3 in order to produce the new outcome.  In Figure 5, the 
reliable promisors can offer point E and thus signal their greater probability of performance.  
Point E lies just to the right of the unreliable promisor cost curve CU, so the unreliable promisors 
will prefer to offer point B along their own value curve rather than following the reliable 
promisors in offering point E.  Having signaled their difference from the unreliable promisors, 
the reliable promisors are able to offer point E along the reliable promisor value line instead of 
being forced to use the pooled value line.        
 Like the pooled equilibrium in Figure 4, the separating equilibrium depicted in Figure 5 
is not an efficient outcome.  Both reliable and unreliable promisors would face lower costs by 
offering promises at point A as opposed to their respective outcomes at points E and B.  
Assuming the value curves correspond with the benefit derived by promisees, the promisees as a 
group should be indifferent between receiving promises at point A from both types of promisors 
or receiving promises from the reliable promisors at point E and from the unreliable ones at point 
C
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B.  As such, a pooled equilibrium at point A would represent a near Pareto improvement over the 
separating equilibrium at points B and E.190 
Why then don’t the reliable promisors just stick with offering promises at point A rather 
than moving to point E?  Because the reliable promisors do not actually have the choice between 
offering promises at point A or at point E.  From a starting place of point A, reliable promisors 
face incentives to instead offer point C.  Once the unreliable promisors follow the reliable types 
in offering point C, point A is no longer available.  Any promise made at point A would be seen 
as coming from an unreliable promisor.  Continuing their attempts to signal their greater 
reliability, reliable promisors will offer promises further to the right along the reliable promisor 
value curve VR. Unreliable promisors will follow these signals until the reliable promisors end 
up offering point E, at which time it becomes preferable for the unreliable promisors to offer 
point B along their own value curve.  Any reliable promisors who sought to depart from the new 
equilibrium outcome by offering a promise to the left of point E would be viewed as unreliable 
and would thus need to offer a promise along the unreliable promisor value curve.  Once again, 
the signaling process ends up harming both types of promisors. 
 
190 The pooled outcome represents only a near pareto improvement rather than an actual pareto improvement 
because it has different distributional implications for individual promisees within the larger group.   
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These inefficient outcomes can be prevented by setting the maximum sanctions at the 
appropriate level.191 Figure 6 shows how the promisors from Figure 5 could benefit by a 
reduction in the maximum level of legal sanctions.192 With the maximum allowable sanctions 
set so as to intersect point A, reliable promisors will be unable to signal by increasing their 
choice of sanctions above the level of point A.  Consequently, both reliable and unreliable 
promisors will promise at Point A, thus improving the welfare of both types of promisors.  
 
191 Pooled equilibriums like those depicted in Figure 3 can always be made more efficient by setting the maximum 
level of sanctions at an appropriate level.  This result comes partially from the fact that pooled equilibrium can only 
result from a maximum level of sanctions.  Were sanctions unlimited—either by the law or by promisors’ wealth—a 
separating equilibrium would always result. 
 However, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium that cannot be made more efficient by 
imposing a maximum level of legal sanctions.  See Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 397. 
192 It is easy to see how the same result can be reached for the promisors in the pooled equilibrium from Figure 3.  
The separating equilibrium in Figure 4 can be transformed into a pooled equilibrium by shifting the level of 
maximum sanctions to the left of where curve CU intersects curve VR. This would cause both types of promisors to 
promise where the new maximum sanctions line intersected curve VR. Since this result is less efficient than pooling 
at point A, further reducing the level of maximum sanctions would thus benefit both types of promisors.   
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The Aghion-Hermalin model shows how a limit on the maximum level of legal sanctions 
can enhance welfare.  By limiting the sanctions that a promisor can offer in the event of breach, 
the law can prevent inefficient signaling.  As Aghion and Hermalin summarize their findings: 
 
Parties to a contract may enter into inefficient contracts because of asymmetric information.  
Under asymmetric information, a contract plays two roles.  First, it sets the terms of trade, 
and, second, it can reveal private information.  As it is the first role that determines the 
efficiency of a contract, the second role can lead to inefficiency.  Restrictions on contracts can 
increase efficiency if they limit the signaling role without affecting the terms of trade role.193 
However, just because a limit on sanctions can improve welfare does not mean that it 
does improve welfare.  Without knowing the slopes of promisor cost and value curves, we 
cannot know the appropriate setting for the maximum level of legal sanctions.  The consideration 
doctrine might reduce sanctions to an inefficiently low level.   
 
Figure 7 shows the consequences of setting the maximum level of legal sanctions too 
low.  Instead of creating a pooled equilibrium at point A, promisors are limited to the level of 
sanctions associated with point F.  Hence, point F represents the new pooled equilibrium 
outcome.  Since point F lies to the northeast of the cost curves both promisors would have faced 
 
193 Aghion & Hermalin, supra note 134, at 403. 
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had they been able to offer point A, point F is an inefficient outcome.  Allowing promisors to 
offer point A would create a Pareto improvement—enhancing the welfare of both types of 
promisors without harming promisees. 
 The maximum level of legal sanctions can be set too high or too low.  Either result 
diminishes welfare.  The question, then, is how to set sanctions at the appropriate level.  Are 
parties made better off when they can back their promises by legal damages or would welfare be 
enhanced by limiting them to the damages corresponding with social stigma?  As noted in Part 
III, our formal models cannot answer this question.194 But the Aghion-Hermalin model can—
and does—disprove the current paradigm of assuming that parties who utilize a legally binding 
option necessarily benefit from the existence of that option. 
 
194 See supra note 142, and accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX B.  AN EXTENSION OF THE AGHION-HERMALIN MODEL 
This Appendix concludes our formal proof for the problem of inefficient signaling, as 
discussed in Part III of the paper and in Appendix A.  The Aghion-Hermalin Model described in 
Appendix A proves that the mere fact that parties employ a legally binding form should not be 
taken as evidence that the parties desire the continuation of that form.  Parties may be made 
better off when denied the option to back their promises with legal damages.  Nevertheless, the 
Aghion-Hermalin Model tells our story imperfectly.  Since the model uses only two types of 
promisors, it cannot fully demonstrate how a legally binding form can create a negative spiral 
harming larger groups of promisors and promisees.  Crucially, the model does not provide any 
means for showing how the imposition of a legally binding option affects promisees.  Moreover, 
the model’s assumption that damages fall on a continuous scale departs from our intuitions about 
promises and contracts.  Parties may often have only two options for damages—either a fixed 
amount of stigma if the promise is not legally binding, or else a set level of legal damages if the 
promise is backed by law.195 
Consequently, we have extended Aghion and Hermalin’s work to develop our own 
model.  Our model uses four types of promisors and allows only two options for remedies—
either stigma-related penalties or full expectation damages.  We have kept our model 
significantly less formal than Aghion and Hermalin’s in order to fit its analysis within the space 
constraints of this article.  Nevertheless, our model does rest on a few simple equations.   
 To begin elaborating our model, we need to define a few terms.  Let X measure the size 
of a promise.  And let Pi measure a promisor’s probability of breach (for promisors i equals one 
through four).  We use Pavg to indicate the average probability of breach for all promisors who do 
not employ the legally binding form, assuming an equal percentage of each type of promisor 
within the overall population.  Hence, Pavg also refers to the perceived likelihood of breach for 
promisors not using the legally enforceable option.196 
Using the constant R as a placeholder coefficient, we express the benefit promisors 
receive from making a promise as: (1-Pavg)RX.  Looking back to our discussions of the benefit 
promisors receive from promising, recall that promisor benefit increases with the size of the 
promise (X),197 but is discounted by the promisor’s perceived reliability (1-Pavg).198 
195 In theory, promisors can use liquidated damages clauses to set legal sanctions at any level they like.  Yet practical 
considerations often prevent the use of liquidated damages clauses.  Current doctrine places limits on the use of 
these clauses, frequently ignoring the clauses in favor of expectation damages.  Even when the courts do enforce 
these clauses, contracting parties may find it difficult to agree upon a specified amount of damages at contract 
formation.  Consequently, parties often have only a single choice for the level of legal damages.  Similarly, parties 
often have little control over the damages of social stigma.  Parties may sometimes be able to alter stigma-related 
damages by making their promises more or less publicly, but it is hard to negotiate publicity.  Regardless of what the 
parties agree on, promisees face incentives to later publicize the promise in order to deter breach.  Hence, parties 
may often have only two options for damages – either a set level of legal damages or a set level of stigma damages.  
When legal enforcement is not available, parties may not have any choice regarding the level of sanctions, with the 
set level of stigma damages being their only option. 
196 The reason follows from our specification that perceived reliability comes from the average reliability of all 
promisors with similar observable characteristics.  Any promisors with distinctive observable characteristics would 
be excluded from our pool. 
197 See note 179, supra, and accompanying text. 
198 See notes 139-141, supra, and accompanying text. 
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 Of course, there are costs to fulfilling a promise.  These costs are discounted by the 
promisor’s actual probability of performance, rather than perceived probability of performance, 
since the costs are only incurred if the promise is fulfilled.  The costs of completing a promise 
can thus be expressed as: (1-Pi)XE. The E exponent is used so that costs increase faster than 
benefits.  Without the use of an exponent, either all promises would be infinitely sized or else no 
promises would be made.  The use of an exponent also captures the intuition that there are 
increasing marginal costs to making promises larger in size. 
 Finally, promisors also face stigma-related costs in the event of breach.  Using the 
constant S as a coefficient for the impact of stigma, these costs can be expressed as: (Pi)SX.         
 Combining the terms, we can calculate the total welfare a promisor expects to receive 
from making a non-legally binding promise as:199 
(A) Promisor Welfare (not bound) = (1-Pavg)RX – (1-Pi)XE – (Pi)SX 
 
Through the use of a legally binding form, a promisor can essentially reduce both her 
perceived probability of breach (Pavg) and actual probability of breach (Pi) to zero, insofar as they 
affect the first two terms.200 As such, the welfare promisors derive from making binding 
promises can be expressed as:201 
(B) Promisor Welfare (bound) = RX – XE – (Pi)(S+D)X   
 
The first two terms come directly from equation A above.  The simplification results 
from setting both Pi and Pavg to zero.  The final term comes from adding the costs of legal 
damages—D—to the costs associated with stigma in the case where the promisor is unable to 
perform.  Despite being bound, circumstances may prevent the promisor from fulfilling the 
promise in the manner originally intended.202 The constant D captures any additional costs—
beyond stigma—that legal sanctions impose on the promisor over the costs that would have been 
incurred were she able to perform.203 
In order to calculate the welfare received by promisees, we need to introduce the 
placeholder constants H, L, and V.  V acts as a coefficient on the value promisees receive from a 
fulfilled promise.  H relates to the harm promisees suffer from relying on a non-legally binding 
promise that is breached.  For promises that are legally binding, L measures the legal costs 
 
199 The first term corresponds with the promisor’s value curves—Figure 2 in Appendix A.  The second and third 
terms combine to form the promisor’s cost curves—Figure 3 in Appendix A. 
200 The remedy of expectation damages means that even in the event of breach the promisor must still confer a 
benefit to the promisee equivalent to that originally promised.  Hence, Pi and Pavg become zero for the first two 
terms. Any difference between the costs incurred in paying these damages and the actual costs of performance is 
measured by the constant D.  Pi does not become zero in the third term, as promisors are only subject to stigma and 
legal damages in the case of breach. 
201 Although we label the equations as referring to actual welfare for simplicity and brevity, all four equations 
actually refer to expected welfare. 
202 While impossibility can sometimes be used as a defense excusing non-performance, it is easy to imagine 
circumstances that fall short of impossibility but that would still cause a sincere promisor to breach. 
203 D can be negative if the cost of legal sanctions is less than the originally anticipated cost of performance or if 
stigma is less burdensome in the legally binding scenario than in the unbound scenario.  D essentially acts as a 
composite term for any differences in the costs associated with breach when a promisor is legally bound than when 
the promisor is not bound.  
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associated with forcing the promisor to pay damages.204 As such, we can express the welfare 
promisees receive from non-binding and binding promises, respectively, as:  
 
(C) Promisee Welfare (not bound) = (1-Pi)VX – Pi(HX) 
 
(D) Promisee Welfare (bound) = VX – Pi(LX) 
 
Using these equations, we can model the welfare consequences of introducing a legally 
binding form.  Whether allowing the option for legal enforcement enhances or diminishes overall 
welfare depends on the settings for the constants and on the promisors’ probabilities of breach.  
Just as the results of the Aghion-Hermalin model depend on the slopes for the promisors’ cost 
and value curves, the results of our model depend on the settings for the terms used to calculate 
the parties’ costs and values. 
Figure 8 shows the model’s results when Pi=(5%, 10%, 15%, 20%), E=2, V=15, H=2, 
L=5, C=2, S=20, and D=24.  X is set at 10 in the absence of a legally binding option, and is 
derived from the above equations when promises can be made legally binding.205 R is derived 
and then used as a constant.206 
The first column in Figure 8 shows the welfare received by each promisor and promisee 
in the absence of a legally binding option.  The numbers in the parentheses next to the values for 
promisor welfare depict the welfare each promisor would receive were she to employ a legally 
binding form.  Hence, once such a form is introduced, promisor one should choose to bind 
herself because doing so increases her welfare from 95 to 107.  None of the other promisors 
immediately bind themselves, as doing so would reduce their welfare.  
 Yet after promisor one chooses to bind herself, she is no longer included in the pool used 
to calculate Pavg. The second column shows the welfare promisors two through four—and their 
respective promisees—would receive from making non-legally binding promises subject to the 
higher value for Pavg. Even though promisor two received more welfare from making a non-
binding promise while promisor one remained part of the pool (with a potential welfare of 90 for 
a non-binding promise and 85 for a binding promise), with promisor one removed from the pool, 
promisor two can gain more welfare from exercising the legally binding option (with a potential 
welfare of 84 for the non-binding promise and 85 for the binding promise).  Hence, promisor two 
follows promisor one in utilizing the legally binding form, and Pavg increases yet again as we 
move to the final column. 
 
204 L also includes any other differences between the value that the promisee receives from legal sanctions and the 
value the promisee would receive had the promisor performed faithfully.  As with D, L is a composite term and can 
be negative. 
205 Although the promisors initially make promises of the same size, they may alter the size of their promises when 
faced with the costs associated with making their promises legally binding.  Unlike in the Aghion-Hermalin model, 
signaling is not an issue once promisors enter the legally binding form.  The only signal that can be sent is to use the 
form. 
 The level for X is calculated by taking the derivative of the equation for promisor value with respect to X, 
setting the derivative equal to zero, and then solving for X.  This method calculates the setting for X which produces 
the maximum benefit for promisors—the setting that would be chosen by an economically rational promisor. 
206 R equals approximately 23 in the calculations behind both Figure 7 and Figure 8.  The level of R is calculated so 
that X remains the same across all four promisors in the unbound scenario. 
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Promisors three and four still gain more welfare from abstaining from the legally binding 
form, making column three our final outcome.  Both the overall group of promisors and the 
overall group of promisees lose welfare from the introduction of the legally binding option.  
Total promisor welfare drops from 350 to 335 and total promisee welfare drops from 515 to 510 
as we move from column one to column three.207 Although promisor one and her associated 
promisee benefit from the legally binding option, their gains are overwhelmed by the losses 
suffered by the other promisors and promisees.208 Overall welfare is maximized by not allowing 
promisors the option of securing their promises through law. 
 
Figure 9 shows how a legally binding form can enhance welfare with the constants 
specified differently.  The only difference between the calculations underlying Figures 8 and 9 is 
that D is set at twenty-four in Figure 8 and at ten in Figure 9.  Consequently, the promisors in 
 
207 Although promisees benefit from being paid legal damages, this benefit is overwhelmed by the losses they suffer 
as promisors decrease the size of their promises in response to the cost of possibly needing to pay the damages.  If 
promisors refrained from promising all together, rather than just decreasing the size of their promises, these losses 
might be even more severe. 
208 Promisee two also gains, even though promisor two does not. 
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Figure 9 suffer relatively smaller losses from the need to pay legal sanctions in the case of breach 
as compared to the promisors in Figure 8.  This reduced value for D is sufficient to alter the 
results so that the introduction of a legally binding option enhances welfare. 
 All four promisors choose to bind themselves in Figure 9.  First, promisors one and two 
bind themselves, moving us to column two.  Even though promisor three faced incentives to 
refrain from using the legally binding form while promisors one and two remained part of the 
pool, the reduced value for Pavg in column two leads promisor three to bind herself as well.  With 
all of the other promisors bound in column three, promisor four also binds herself to generate the 
outcome in the last column.  Despite the fact that promisors three and four lose welfare from the 
introduction of the legally binding form, the overall group of promisors increases its welfare 
from 350 to 368 and the overall group of promisees increases its welfare from 515 to 550.  In 
contrast to Figure 8, allowing a legally binding option enhances welfare. 
Of course, these figures depict only two possible settings for the constants.  By adjusting 
the constants, we can create numerous alternative scenarios.  Some scenarios will show that the 
introduction of a legally binding form enhances welfare, while other scenarios will show welfare 
losses coming from allowing the form.  The question remains whether parties are better off when 
they can back their promises with legal damages or when they are limited to the damages created 
by social stigma.  As stated in Part III of the paper, our formal models cannot answer this 
question.209 We lack the information needed to determine reasonable values for the constants; 
and slight adjustments to the constants can switch the results over a wide range of possible 
settings.210 As with Aghion and Hermalin’s work in Appendix A, our model can only disprove 
the dominant wisdom that parties who take advantage of a legally binding option necessarily 
desire the existence of that option. 
 
209 See supra note 142, and accompanying text. 
210 We encourage readers to play with the model’s specifications in order to demonstrate this fact for themselves.  
We will happily send an excel spreadsheet which can be used to calculate the model’s results for different settings of 
the constants to any reader who requests it. 
